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The Grassroots Struggle for Environmental Justice:
The Need for a New Approach to Public Health in Kern County, California

Committee Chair:

Bruce Jennings

Environmental justice activists are fighting to change the fact that poor communities
and communities of color are disproportionately burdened with environmental hazards
including toxic waste dumps and incinerators, radio-active waste disposal sites, polluted
air, contaminated drinking water, and exposure to lead and pesticides.
In the low-income, predominately Latino, farm worker community of Buttonwillow,
California, Laidlaw Inc. is attempting to expand its toxic waste facility. A community
group. Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor (Padres), has been organizing to block the proposed
expansion.
This professional paper examines the role of the local Kern County Public Health
Department (Department) in the environmental justice movement by addressing the
following research question: How does the Department’s toxics policy affect Padres'
struggle for environmental justice?
The Department's toxics policy is based on the philosophy that toxics are not a threat to
public health unless scientific evidence proves a causal relationship. This policy
directly undermines Padres' efforts to achieve environmental justice for two primary
reasons. First, the policy makes the Department less accessible to community groups as
a potential source of information and support. While the Department claims to practice
an "expert" scientific approach to public health, the concerns and recommendations of
"non-expert" community groups are often dismissed as "emotional" and "biased." This
devaluation of the "non-expert" perspective makes it extremely difficult for groups like
Padres to participate in the decision-making process and it decreases the potential for
the development of an effective working relationship with the Department.
The Department also hinders Padres' efforts because its toxics policy conflicts directly
with the goal of illness prevention. As long as the Department demands scientific proof
or certainty, people will be harmed before any action is taken. In addition, the
Department's policy supports the conventional approach to hazardous waste management
— pollution control — which is an "end-of-the-pipe" strategy that focuses on managing
pollutants after they have been discharged. Pollution control does not prevent pollution
or illness because it perpetuates the myth that toxics are innocent until proven guilty.
Toxics Use Reduction, a strategy committed to eliminating or reducing the volume and
toxicity of the chemicals used in production processes, is presented as the preferred
alternative because it promotes pollution prevention and illness prevention.
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Introduction

W e the People of Color, gathered together at this multinational People o f
C olor Environm ental Leadership Summit, to begin to build a national and
international m ovement of all peoples of color to fight the destruction and
taking of our lands and communities, do hereby re-establish our spiritual
interdependence to the sacredness of Mother Earth; to respect and celebrate
each of our cultures, languages and beliefs about the natural world and our
roles in healing ourselves; to insure environm ental justice; to promote
econom ic alternatives which would contribute to the developm ent of
environmentally safe livelihoods; and, to secure our political economic and
cultural liberation that has been denied for over 500 years of colonization
and oppression, resulting in the poisoning of our communities and land and
the genocide of our peoples, do affirm and adopt these Principles of
Environmental Justice..."'

The grassroots environmental justice movement "in all aspects of its operations
is anti-bourgeois, anti-racist, class conscious, populist, and participatory. It attacks
environmental problems as being intertwined with other pressing economic, social, and
political ills."2 Environmental justice activists argue that issues of social justice cannot
and should not be excluded from traditional mainstream concerns for the environment;
in addition to being committed to halting the destruction and exploitation of wilderness
and natural resources, "environmentalists" must also be committed to ending the
destruction and exploitation of poor communities and communities of color.
The emergence and rapid growth of this grassroots movement has challenged and
derailed the misconception that the low participation of people of color in the
mainstream environmental movement reflects their general lack of concern for

^ On October 24, 1991, the First National People of Color Environmental
Leadership Summit was held in Washington, D.C.. More than 500 grassroots activists
from the United States, Latin America, Canada and the Pacific voted unanimously to adopt
17 Priniciples of Environmental Justice.
2 Regina Austin and Michael Schill, "Black, Brown & Poisoned: Minority
Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice," The Kansas Journal of
Law and Public Policy (Summer 1991): 79.
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environmental issues: "...although many researchers have argued that minorities are too
busy struggling to meet basic needs to be concerned with environmental issues,
minorities have redefined environmental issues as survival issues and have been
organizing around them at an unprecedented rate."3
Environmental justice activists are fighting to change the fact that poor
communities and communities of color are burdened with the majority of environmental
hazards including toxic waste dumps and incinerators, radio-active waste disposal sites,
polluted air, contaminated drinking water, and exposure to lead and pesticides."^ In
California, for example, all three of the state's Class 1 toxic waste dumps are located in
the poor, predominately Latino, farm worker communities of Buttonwillow, Kettleman
City and Westmorland.^

3 Dorceta Taylor, "The Environmental Justice Movement: No shortage of
Minority Volunteers,"
EPA Journal 18 (March/April 1992): 24.
^ U.S. General Accounting Office, Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their
Correlation With Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities (Washington
D.C.: Governm ent Printing Office G AO /RCED -83-168, 1983)[hereinafter G AO , Siting
of Hazardous W aste Landfills): United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice,
Toxic Wastes And Race In The United States: A National Report on the Racial and SocioEconomic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites
(1987)[hereinafter UCC, Toxic Wastes and R acel: Jane Kay, "Toxic Racism: Minorities
Bear the Brunt of Pollution," San Francisco Examiner 7 April 1991; Citizens For A
Better Environment, Richmond at Risk: Community Development and Toxic Hazards from
Industrial Polluters (1989); Bradley Angel, "The Toxic Threat to Indian Lands"
(G reenpeace, June 1991); Jane Kay, "Indian Lands Targeted for W aste Disposal Sites,"
San Francisco Examiner 10 April 1991, A-10; Robert D. Bullard, ed., Dumping in
Dixie: Race. Class and Environmental Quality (Boulder: Westview, 1990); Robert D.
Bullard, ed.. Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices From the Grassroots (Boston:
South End Press, 1993); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Equity:
Reducing Risks for All Communities. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office
A 2 3 0 -R -9 2 -0 0 8 , June 1992); Paul Mohai and Bunyan Bryant, "Environmental
Racism: Reviewing the Evidence," in Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A
Tim e for Discourse, eds. Bunyan Bryant and Paul Mohai(Boulder: W estview, 1992). For
an extensive list of additional references, see Luke W. Cole, "Empowerment as the Key to
Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law," Ecology Law
Q u a r te r ly 19:619 (1 9 92 ): 6 2 2 -6 2 7 .
5 Buttonwillow is 52% Latino and 11% African-American, Kettleman City is
95% Latino and Westmorland is 72% Latino. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of
Com m erce, 1990 Census of Population and Housing. Summary Population and Housing
C haracteristics: C alifornia. 62, 66, 73.
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This siting pattern of toxic dumps in California is not an isolated exam ple. In
1982 attempts were made to site a toxic polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) landfill in the
low-income, African-American Warren County, North Carolina; more than 500 people
were arrested for participating in a civil disobedience campaign against the proposed
siting.® Although these attempts to block the landfill were unsuccessful, the protest
received national attention, and as a result, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
launched an investigation to examine the siting of toxic dumps in EPA's region 4
(Alabam a, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and
Tennessee). The 1983 GAO study revealed that three of the four major toxic dumps in
that region were located in poor, African-American communities even though AfricanAmericans comprised only one-fifth of that region's population.^
The next landmark study on this issue was published in 1987 by the United
Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice. This was the first comprehensive
national report documenting the connection between race, income and the location of
toxic waste facilities.® The results from this report were based on two studies initiated
in 1986; 1) demographic patterns associated with commercial hazardous waste sites;
and 2) demographic patterns associated with uncontrolled toxic waste sites.® The report
contained the following conclusions:
•

Race was the most significant variable among those tested in determining the location
of commercial hazardous waste facilities;

® Paul Mohai and Bunyan Bryant, "Environmental Racism: Reviewing the
Evidence," in Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A Time for Discourse.
eds., Bunyan Bryant and Paul Mohai(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
7 Robert D. Bullard, ed., Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice and
Communities of Color (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1994).
® UCC, Toxic Wastes and Race.
® The report defined a "commercial facility as "any facility (public or private)
which accepts hazardous wastes from a third party for a fee or other remuneration." The
term "uncontrolled toxic waste sites" are defined as "closed and abandoned sites on the
EPA's list of sites which pose a present and potential threat to human health and the
environm ent."
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The proportion of people of color In communities with a toxic waste facility was
twice as high as the proportion in communities without such a facility. When
communities had two or more sites, or one of the nation's five largest landfills, the
proportion of people of color was more than three times as high (38% vs. 12%);
African American and Latino communities were burdened with three out of the five
largest commercial hazardous waste landfills. These three landfills represent 4 0%
of the total estimated commercial landfill capacity in the United States; and
Three out of five African Americans and Latinos and approximately one half of all
Asian/Pacific Islanders and Native Americans lived in communities with
uncontrolled toxic waste sites.

Although the publication of this report helped focus national attention on the
issue of environmental justice, an updated report, "Toxic Wastes and Race Revisited,"
concluded that conditions have worsened: "...people of color today are even more likely
than whites to live in communities with commercial hazardous waste facilities than they
were a decade ago." Some of the major findings from this updated 1994 report revealed
the following: 1) In 1993, people of color were 47% more likely than whites to live
near a commercial hazardous waste facility; and 2) Since 1980, there has been no
improvement — the percentage of people of color remains three times higher in areas
containing the highest concentration of commercial hazardous waste facilities."'*^
There are several reasons why companies interested in operating a hazardous
waste facility may be attracted to poor communities and communities of color: 1) These
communities often lack the economic resources necessary to utilize traditional legal
services; 2) These communities often lack the political power necessary to affect the
decision making process; 3) in poor communities, companies can often win the support

Dr. Benjamin A. Goldman & Laura Fitton, Toxic Wastes And Race Revisited: An
Update Of The 1987 Report On The Racial And Socioeconomic Characteristics Of
Communities With Hazardous Waste Sites (Washington, D.C.: Center for Policy
Alternatives, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and United
Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, 1994).
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of the community by promising jobs and other economic benefitsJ ^ In general, these
communities represent the "path of least resistance."
In addition to the studies investigating the connection between race, socio
economic status and the siting of hazardous waste facilities, the National Law Journal
(NLJ) published a special investigation which revealed that there is also a "racial divide
in the way the U.S.. government cleans up toxic waste sites and punishes polluters."^^
Som e of the key findings from this report include:

•

When hazardous waste laws were violated in communities with the greatest white
population, the penalties were approximately 500 percent higher than the penalties
assessed in communities with the greatest population of people of color ($335,566
vs. $55,318.) Penalties associated with violations of other environmental laws
including air, water and waste pollution, were 46% higher in white communities.

•

Abandoned hazardous waste sites located in communities of color take 20% longer to
be placed on the national priority action list.

•

In more than half of the 10 EPA regions in the country, the clean up of Superfund
sites begins from 12% to 42% later at sites located in communities of color.

The EPA claims that many factors affect decisions regarding the siting of
facilities, clean up, and the determination of penalties. Although the economic, legal and
scientific factors vary in each case, the EPA claims that each situation is handled in the
same manner regardless of race or socio-economic status. In a 1992 EPA publication,
the Administrator of the EPA, William Reilly, described the Agency's general position
regarding the environmental justice debate; "I have a certain idea about environmental
protection: It is about all of us; it benefits all of us... That's why talk of environmental

11 Robert D. Bullard, "Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities," (A
paper prepared for presentation at the Conference on Race and the Incidence of
Environmental Hazards, January 25-28, University of Michigan School of Natural
Resources, 1990).
"'2 Marianne LaVelle and Marcia Coyle, "Unequal Protection; The Racial Divide in
Environmental Law, A Special Investigation," National Law Journal ( 21 September
1992): S I . This was an 8 month study which evaluated census data, the civil court case
docket of the EPA, and the EPA's own record of performance at 1,177 Superfund toxic
waste sites.
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racism at EPA and charges that the Agency's efforts pay less regard to the environments
of poor people infuriate me."^^
Professor Robert Bullard, a sociologist at the University of California,
Riverside, disagrees:
The science may be present, but when it comes to implementation and policy, a
lot of decisions appear to be based on the politics of what's appropriate for that
community. And low-income and minority communities are not given the same
priority, nor do they see the same speed at which something is perceived as a
danger and a threat.""'^

Mr. Reilly argued that, "It is also undeniable that minorities usually benefit
from - are indeed, sometimes the chief beneficiaries of - more general efforts to protect
the environment."^5 In the same EPA Journal, others voiced a very different opinion
when asked: "Have minorities benefited equitably from the gains made by the
environmental movement?" Excerpts from some of the responses include:

"The answer is clearly no....The social aspects of the environmental movement have,
almost without exception, systematically excluded people of color. People of color
are underrepresented at managerial and decision-making levels of both
governmental and non governmental environmental organizations, including my
own."*'^ - Michel Gelobter, Assistant Commissioner of Environmental Quality for the
Department of Environmental Protection of New York City.
"It is an incontestable fact that people of color and the poor of America have borne
the brunt of suffering from polluting industries and other undesirable development.
Whether intended or not (and all too often it has been intended), economic growth and
land use decisions have been based on environmental racism."'’ ^ - Michael Fischer,
Executive Director of the Sierra Club.

13 United States Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Journal: Environmental
Protection-Has It Been Fair? (March/April 1992), 18.
Ibid.
15 Ibid., 22.
16 Ibid., 32
17 Ibid., 33. It should be noted that mainstream national environmental
organizations like the Sierra Club have only recently begun to participate in the
environm ental justice debate. In January of 1990, approximately 150 civil rights
organizations sent a letter to the national mainstream environmental organizations
accusing them of environmental racism in their policymaking and hiring practices.
During that same year, the Southwest Organizing Committee sent another letter focusing
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"No, minorities have not benefited from the environmental movement. Although the
f^others of East Los Angeles participated in the 20th anniversary of Earth Day, our
own environmental movement is just beginning. The amount of environmental abuse
suffered by residents of our barrios is just too g r e a t . "^8 . ju a n a Beatriz Gutierrez,
President of the Santa Isabel chapter of the Mothers of East Los Angeles.

Although poor communities and communities of color often lack economic and
political power, the grassroots environmental justice movement has witnessed an
increasing number of communities that have stepped off the "path of least resistance" to
challenge and defeat unwanted projects. An important battle was waged in South Central
Los Angeles which revealed the underestimated strength of a politically organized and
empowered community. In 1985, attempts were made to build a solid waste incinerator
in South Central Los Angeles. The incinerator would have burned 2,000 tons of
municipal waste per day. The company promised new jobs and other economic benefits to
this predominately African American and Latino community crippled by a 78%
unemployment rate and an average income ($8,158) less than half that of the general
Los Angeles population. While the company was busy selling its project, called
“LANCER", to the community, concerned citizens began to meet once a week in the local
library to investigate the potential health effects associated with the project. W hat they
found was that if they chose to accept the economic benefits, which turned out to be equal
to 50 new jobs,

they would also be accepting the lung irritations, skin rashes, lesions,

tumors, and exposure to dioxin that accompany toxic waste

in c in e r a to r s .

The group of neighbors who decided to fight the LANCER project formed a
grassroots community group known as Concerned Citizens of South Central (hereafter,
"Concerned Citizens"). This group organized protests and rallies during public hearings

on the mainstream environmental organizations' failure to address issues affecting the
poor and people of color.
I® Ibid.
19 Cynthia Hamilton, "Women Home & Community: The Struggle in an Urban
Environment," Race Poverty & the Environment ( April 1990): 3; Jesus Sanchez, "The
Environm ent: W hose Movement?," California Tomorrow (Fall 1988):11-17.
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and in local parks and churches. When these initial efforts proved to be ineffective,
Concerned Citizens solicited support from other individuals and groups inside and
outside of their community including elected representatives, scientists, student
activists, and predominately white, middle class environmental groups. The resulting
alliance was rare because it united people of different racial and socioeconomic
backgrounds.
Although rare, the alliance was effective; in April, 1987, the Los Angeles City
Council denied the LANCER conditional use permit. Shortly thereafter, another company
tried to site a toxic incinerator, this time in Vernon, a predominately Latino community
located just a few miles away. Confronted with this new threat. Concerned Citizens of
South Central joined forces with another grassroots environmental justice group.
Mothers of East L. A.. This new alliance. Concerned Citizens and Mothers of East L.A.,
sued the government and won.
One of the defining characteristics of the majority of environmental justice
struggles is the lack of emphasis and dependence on "experts." Instead, environmental
justice activists challenge “experts" such as lawyers, scientists and public health
officials to change the current policies and practices which contribute to social and
environmental injustice: "The grassroots folk spend a good deal of time battling
experts.,.in an effort to make questions of risk distribution not simply a matter of
science and technology, but also a matter of politics and social responsibility."20
Instead of relying on "experts," the movement often embraces strategies which involve
direct action such as distributing fliers to educate the community; leading marches,
demonstrations and protests; and confronting people in power by attending public
hearings to testify, question, and challenge the decision-makers.
Although the movement's primary strength is found in the angry, determined and
dedicated voices of grassroots community activists, and although use of "experts" is often
20 Regina Austin and Michael Schill, "Black, Brown & Poisoned," 75.
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de-em phasized, these "experts" — bureaucrats, lawyers, epidemiologists, engineers —
still influence the outcome of environmental justice struggles. In many cases, especially
those involving the siting or expansion of a toxic facility, the role of some "experts" is
clear; they either advance the goals of the environmental justice movement by providing
grassroots activists with legal, technical or other support services, or they assist the
parties interested in siting or expanding the facility. This paper evaluates a group of
"experts" — the Kern County Public Health Department (Department) — within the
context of an environmental justice struggle currently taking place in Buttonwillow,
California, where a community group — Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor (Padres) — is
fighting to stop the expansion of one of the state's three Class 1 toxic waste dumps
operated by Laidlaw, Inc..

The Research Question

One of the central objectives of this research paper is to examine the role of
local public health "experts."

As "experts," local health officials practice a scientific

approach to public health that focuses on gathering and evaluating statistically
significant numbers and "objective" data.

As "experts" they interpret their scientific

findings to design and implement public health policies.
In addition to being public health "experts," local health officials are also
responsible for developing and maintaining close ties with the communities in their
county. This direct link is necessary because local health departments are often the
primary or only source of health care and information in low-income and rural
communities. In order to effectively address the communities' health needs and concerns,
local health departments must be culturally and economically accessible to the public.
The Kern County Health Department establishes these goals in its mission statement:
"1) maintain culturally appropriate education and public health promotion efforts; 2)
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build and foster strong partnerships for health with local public/ private health and
social service agencies, community based organizations, consumers, educational
institutions and other interested community groups; and 3) improve the quality and
cultural competency of the Department's operations, services and programs.
Although this written mission statement clearly demonstrates the Department's
commitment to serving the local communities in Kern County, how does this mission
statement translate into practice within the context of the toxics debate? As "experts,"
how well do they relate to grassroots community groups like Padres who are not
"experts" in the field of public health? While both the Department and Padres are
concerned with protecting public health, do they embrace common strategies for
achieving this goal? Can "experts" and non-"experts" work effectively together?
This paper explores these types of questions by addressing the following
research question; How does the Department's toxics policy affect Padres struggle for
environm ental justice?
The Department is not formally involved in the permitting process regarding the
siting or expansion of toxic waste dumps; as a result, it does not officially participate in
the heated political debates that accompany many environmental conflicts. The
Departm ent argues that it is obligated to avoid "taking sides" so that it may pursue and
uncover the "objective" scientific facts in each situation. However, Padres' struggle,
like most environmental justice battles, is deeply rooted in the group's desire to protect
the community from health problems that the group believes are linked with toxics.
Since the stated mission of the Department is to protect public health, one might
reasonably conclude that these two groups share a common goal. And one might also
expect that the Department would ally itself with Padres to support the goals of
environmental justice groups. The Department, however, does not. This indicates

21 Kern County Public Health Department, "Mission Statement." Photocopied,
1994.
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that the Department's actions and policies create additional obstacles that Padres must
overcom e in its struggle for environmental justice.
Although both groups would strongly defend their commitment to protect public
health, their work is not complimentary because their perspectives towards toxics —
what they define as the problem and what they define as the solution — are vastly
different. While the Department argues that its perspective is "objective" because it is
based on "scientific" facts, it is this same perspective — one that is dependent on
"science" — that has given Padres and others reason to argue that the Department is not
fulfilling its responsibilities to protect public health.
The Department searches for "scientific proof" that a health hazard is causing
illness in a community before it takes any actions to protect the community. At the same
time, it is extremely difficult to prove that exposure to a specific toxic substance caused
a particular health problem, especially in the case of chronic illnesses such as cancer or
birth defects. When epidemiological surveys are conducted in small towns like
Buttonwillow, statistically valid, conclusive results are rare. Instead, the promise of a
public health investigation raises the hopes of the community, only to reveal in the end
that the cause of their problems remains unknown. These types of public health studies
can hurt a community in its fight for environmental justice because there is no "proof"
that the toxic dump is causing any health problems; those interested in siting or
expanding a toxic facility quickly reach the conclusion that these public health studies
support continued operation of a toxic facility. As a result, the burden of proof is placed
on the community to demonstrate "scientifically" that the siting or expansion of a toxic
facility would be hazardous to their health.
The Department's reliance on "scientific" proof to define what qualifies as a
public health threat represents a significant difference in perspective between the
Departm ent and Padres. The implications of this difference, in addition to other
differences uncovered by this research, will be examined in this paper as a tool for
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understanding how the Department has affected Padres' struggle for environmental
ju s tic e .
There were two main reasons I chose to focus on Padres and the Kern County
Public Health Department. The first has to do with timing: since Padres is still in the
process of fighting against the proposed expansion of the dump, I was able to take
advantage of the opportunity to experience a chapter of Padres' struggle as it unfolded. I
attended meetings where I observed the interactions and listened to the dialogue and
debate between Padres, the County representatives, and employees of Laidlaw. And most
importantly, I had the privilege of spending time with the leader of Padres, Rosa
Solorio-Garcia. During this time, I was also very fortunate to be introduced to Stormy
Williams, leader of

Southern Kern Residents Against Pollution (SKRAP). Her years of

experience fighting to reduce toxics in her community — Rosamond, California — made
her insights invaluable; she has dealt directly with the Kern County Health Department
and has witnessed how the Department has handled toxics issues and grassroots groups in
the past.
I also focused on this particular environmental justice struggle because it is
taking place in Kern County. Kern County has a history of toxics-related controversies,
and as a result, the Health Department has had previous experiences with these issues,
including exposure to grassroots groups fighting to reduce toxics in their communities.
Before Padres began its fight in Buttonwillow, the Department had already participated
in two public health investigations in the towns of McFarland and Rosamond. These
investigations focused national attention on the threat of toxics and the potential link to
the cancer clusters found in these Kern County communities.
W hen one reviews these investigations a common pattern appears; a cancer
cluster was discovered that triggered an investigation; the investigation revealed toxic
contamination that officials were not previously aware of; public health officials
attempted to determine whether the contamination caused the cluster but they couldn't
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find "scientific" proof that a link existed; in the end, the cause was never discovered,
and the community was left with many questions and no answers. This pattern repeated
itself in Buttonwillow when a birth defects cluster was discovered in 1991; the
community feared that the birth defects were linked to the toxic dump but health
officials were unable to determine what caused the cluster.
This pattern has caused community leaders like Rosa and Stormy to challenge the
Department's policy and approach to toxics. One of the glaring problems that they see
reflected in this pattern is the fact that illness prevention through toxics use reduction
and other pollution prevention measures is not a top priority; instead, a cancer cluster,
birth defects cluster or other serious illnesses have to be reported before any action is
taken. Of course, by that time, it is too late. For many concerned members in the affected
community, the only question that remains is: When and where will the next cancer
cluster appear?

Methodology
Due to the nature of this project and its focus on a very specific research
question, the majority of the information was gathered by conducting interviews with
specific individuals representing key organizations: 1) Rosa Solorio-Garcia, leader of
Padres; 2) Stormy Williams, leader of

SKRAP; 3) Dr. Babatunde Jinadu, Director of

the Kern County Public Health Department; and 4) Dr. Manzoor Massey, Director of the
Department's Division of Health Promotion and Public Information.
During the initial interviews with Dr. Massey and Dr. Jinadu, both were asked to
respond to the following questions: 1) W hat is the mission of the Kern County Public
Health Department?; 2) What services does the Department provide to residents of
Buttonwillow and other Kern County communities?; 3) Do you feel that the Department
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is adequately serving the Buttonwillow community?; and 4) W hat changes would the
Departm ent make, if any?
After these general questions were raised, more specific questions followed: 1) Is
the Department familiar with Buttonwillow's community group. Padres Hacia Una Vida
Mejor?; 2) W hat, if any, is the Departm ent’s relationship with Padres?; 3) Would the
Departm ent be willing to work with Padres?; 4) W hat is the Department's policy
regarding toxics?; 5} W hat was the Department's role in the Buttonwillow birth defect
cluster investigation?; and 6) W hat was the Department's role in the investigation of
Rosamond's cancer cluster?
The interview questions for Padres followed a similar pattern. The first set of
questions were general: 1) W hat is the mission of Padres?; 2) Is Padres successfully
addressing its goals?; 3) What changes or actions would Padres like to implement?; and
4) W hat are the main barriers faced by Padres? The next set of more specific questions
included the following: 1) W hat role does the Department play in Buttonwillow?; 2)
W hat relationship does Padres have with the Department?; and 3) Can you recommend
any changes or actions that the Department could implement that would help Padres
achieve its goals?
The following interview questions for SKRAP focused on the group's fight to
reduce toxics in its community of Rosamond where the state's highest rate of childhood
cancer was discovered in 1986: 1) W hat relationship does SKRAP have with the
Department?; 2) W hat role did the Department play in the investigation of the childhood
cancer cluster?; 3) In your fight to reduce toxics, did SKRAP seek assistance from the
Department?; 4) Did the Department help or hinder SKRAP's efforts?; 4) Can you
recommend any changes or actions that the Department could implement that would help
your group achieve its goals?
After these initial interviews were conducted, I compiled the recommendations
into one list and sent them to the Department for review. At that time, I explained that
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the recommendations were not based on my personal opinion or assessment of the
Department; I wanted to make sure he understood that the leaders of two grassroots
groups from Kern County created this list to reflect their groups’ concerns and
assessm ent of the Department. After the Department received the list, I interviewed Dr.
Jinadu to record the Department's responses to the recommendations.
To establish the context in which the research question will be addressed.
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 provide the following background information: chapter 1 introduces
Padres; chapter 2 surveys the current situation in Buttonwillow; and chapter 3
describes the mission and policies of the Kern County Public Health Department. This
chapter will also present a case study of the Rosamond cancer cluster investigation to
provide insights into the Department's toxics policy.
Chapter 4 evaluates the Department from the perspective of the leaders of two
grassroots community groups in Kern County, Rosa Soiorio-Garcia of Padres and Stormy
Williams of SKRAP. This chapter includes specific recommendations made by both
leaders who were asked to respond to the question: Are there any changes or actions that
the Departm ent could implement which would help your group in its struggle for
environmental justice? Chapter 5 documents the Department's responses to these
recommendations, and finally, chapter 6 discusses the implications of the Department's
toxics policy. Is the Department's policy consistent with its mission to protect public
health? Can these local health "experts" work effectively with grassroots groups like
Padres? The final chapter examines these issues to help answer the central research
question; How does the Department's toxics policy affect Padres' struggle for
environm ental justice?
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CHAPTER 1
A Closer Look at Grassroots Com m unity Groups:
Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor

Background
In Buttonwillow, California, a grassroots community group. Padres Hacia Una
Vida Mejor (Parents for Better Living or Padres), is attempting to stop the proposed
expansion of a Class 1 toxic waste dump owned by Laidlaw, Inc.'' Padres, was formed in
1991. Its membership consists of six married couples; all of its members are Latino,
the men are farmworkers, and all but two of the women are employed full-time. Rosa
Solorio-Garcia, who was raised in Buttonwillow, is the leader and spokeswoman for
Padres. She is the mother of three boys, and is an elementary school teacher in the
nearby town of Shatter. Her husband, Lorenzo Garcia, is also a member of Padres and is
employed as a farmworker.
Rosa became active in her community when her husband asked if she would
translate for mono-lingual Spanish-speaking parents at a School Board meeting in
Buttonwillow. During the meeting, members of the School Board asked her why these
same parents had never attended meetings in the past. Rosa explained that the parents'
lack of participation was not due to a lack of interest in their children’s education, but
instead to the fact that the school never translated any notices or announcements into

1 See, Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, Laidlaw: A Corporate Profile
(1 9 94 ) [Laidlaw is a 1.9 billion dollar multi-national Canadian corporation based in
Burlington, Ontario. It is the largest school bus operator, the second largest hazardous
waste disposal business and the third largest solid waste management business in North
America. Most of its profits come from its hazardous and sold waste management
operations - 63.6% of revenue from hazardous/solid waste management compared to
3 4.3 % from passenger services. 72% of the revenue is generated in the United States
while 28% is from Canada. Laidlaw's operations include 3,000 trucks, 35 landfill sites,
55 hazardous waste service locations including 2 incinerators, and recycling services
for 1 million households. Over the past 2 decades Laidlaw has bought out over 250
companies which were mostly garbage and toxics companies].

16
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Spanish. After Rosa described the bilingual programs established at her school in
Shatter, the School Board agreed to send notices home in Spanish as well as English.
As Rosa was leaving this meeting, three women approached her to discuss another
meeting regarding the dump. She responded by asking, "What dump?" Although she knew
there was a dump near Buttonwillow, Rosa had never given it much thought. The
following week, as Rosa was returning from a school meeting in Shatter, she decided she
should stop by the Buttonwillow school to see if the Laidlaw meeting was still in session.
Since it was 10 o'clock in the evening, she was surprised to see the parking lot full of
cars. W hen she entered the meeting room she immediately felt out of place; "The whole
room was filled with white people dressed in suits talking technical. There was only one
man from Buttonwillow. There were two Mexicans in the back of the room. I decided to
leave because it was late, I was tired and 1 didn't understand what they were talking
about."2 As she was leaving, a Latino man stopped her at the back of the room and told
her that five others had recently left for the same reasons.
Later, the same three women told Rosa that Laidlaw intended to expand the dump.
They felt that it was important to warn the rest of the community and they turned to her
for guidance. Rosa felt overwhelmed: "They were all coming to me about this. I'm a
teacher. I'm not a community activist. I don't know anything about toxic dumps.
The following week, Rosa found herself driving to another Laidlaw meeting in
B uttonw illow :
All the way home I prayed to God to show me the way because I had no idea. I felt
all this pressure on me. I was afraid. I thought, I don't know anything about this.
These people are depending on me to do something and I can't. Where do I go? I
have no idea who to call. It's not just a m atter of interpreting anymore. This is a
huge company we're dealing with.'^

2 Rosa Solorio-Garcia, interview by author, 10 Novem ber 1994.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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W hen she arrived, the man she recognized from the previous meeting approached and
introduced himself as Lupe Martinez, field organizer for California Rural Legal
Assistance. As he began to tell her details about the dump, the proposed expansion, and
what she could do to challenge the expansion, she decided that others should be listening
to his advice. She invited him over to her house where they held their first meeting
about the dump.

Grassroots Organizing
As Mr. Martinez began to work more closely with Padres, he taught the group
some preliminary tools for organizing a community. One of the first lessons took place
during the next meeting. The group entered and immediately took seats at the back of the
room. As Mr. Martinez continued to the front of the room, he turned to motion them
forward; if they were going to get involved, they should sit in the front of the room to
make sure everyone knew they were there to participate.
It was through Mr. Martinez that members of Padres learned it was possible to
contact television stations, radio stations and other media groups. They learned about
press releases, interviews, and editorials. They made and distributed fliers door to door,
and organized rallies, community meetings and protests.
W hen the group first began to work on the issue of the dump. Padres consisted of
9 women. They conducted outreach throughout the community to educate residents about
the dump and its related health hazards. Eventually, most of the women left the group
because their husbands didn't approve; some worried that their wives would get in
trouble, and others didn't like the fact that it consumed so much of their wives' time. As
Rosa explains, the Mexican culture doesn't generally support the concept of politically
active women who have their own voices apart from their husbands; "Mexican women
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are supposed to be inferior to Mexican men, and if you know more than your husband you
are superior. It’s still there.
As a small grassroots community group, Padres faces many barriers that make
its work very challenging. Rosa is the only member who is fluent in both English and
Spanish; a few members have a limited understanding of the English language while two
m em bers are illiterate.® As a result, the majority of the work that requires writing,
phone calls, media contact, and interviews, is Rosa’s responsibility. Being a full-time
school teacher, mother, and wife, she has very little time or energy to organize a
campaign against a company like Laidlaw with its seemingly endless amount of money,
time, human resources, and technical expertise.
During a typical day it is nearly impossible for Rosa to work on anything related
to Padres. She gets a thirty minute lunch break, and since she is not allowed to make
personal phone calls at work, she must go to a pay phone if she needs to contact somebody
during work hours. She doesn’t get home until 6 p.m., and then it's dinner, homework,
showers, and bed for the boys. She feels that her busy schedule has not allowed her to
reach her potential as an effective grassroots organizer: "I think I could do so many more
things and I could accomplish long term goals if I only had someone to help me with the
menial stuff that I don’t have the energy or time to do. I can't think at 11 o’clock.”
Padres also faces financial difficulties since most of its members make minimal
earnings as farmworkers. When Rosa first became involved, she spent her own money on
faxes, phone calls, photo-copying, mailing and other group-related expenses. Since
these expenses were too much for anyone in the group to absorb, Padres began raising
money by holding annual tamales sales in December which made between 700-800

® Ibid.
® Rosa expressed a desire to bring literacy programs to Buttonwillow,
recognizing that this would be an important step toward empowering the two women in
the group and others in the community. However, she explained that she has not been
able to address the issue of literacy because the struggle with Laidlaw takes up all of the
group’s time and resources.
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dollars. In addition to the tamales sales, Padres organized community dances where they
would take advantage of intermissions to educate the audience about the potential
problems related to the dump. Padres no longer hosts these dances because they were
expensive and difficult to organize, and many people in the audience didn't appreciate
paying money to hear about the dump.
Padres has raised approximately 3,500 dollars. The money is used to help its
m embers with group-related expenses including phone bills, air conditioning in the
summer for people who host meetings, and gas money for those who drive to meetings
held outside of Button willow. The money is also used to help send members to
conferences on related issues, such as environmental justice. Although Padres raises
money to cover its own expenses, the money is also available for people in the
community who have died without the means to pay for their funerals. Padres donates up
to 400 dollars on these occasions. Padres also donates to people who have experienced
some unexpected catastrophe such as losing their house in a fire.

Padres' Role in Buttonwillow
Padres also faces the challenge of gaining the support of the Buttonwillow
community. Rosa hopes that Padres can establish effective working relationships with
the African-American residents, especially the women, whom she believes are active,
vocal and strong. The current community organizer from CRLA, Mario Madrid, is trying
to get African-American churches county wide to join with Padres. Although Padres
receives support from many Latino residents, there are others who don't agree with
Padres' goals or the methods used to achieve those goals.
It is not surprising that Buttonwillow residents employed by Laidlaw do not
support Padres. According to Rosa, one of the most vocal people in Buttonwillow is a
woman who is married to a Laidlaw employee. She has a business which occasionally
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sends her door to door to sell merchandise. She has been known to use this opportunity to
discredit Padres, while spreading the word that Laidlaw is a safe company that the
community would be wise to support.
The town’s Catholic church does not support Padres because it believes the group
is too radical. The Church maintains that events pertaining to the expansion are beyond
its control; whatever is meant to be, will be. Many farmers also feel that Padres is too
radical; they stopped trusting Padres when the group enlisted help from Greenpeace.^
Rosa recalls that Padres had stronger support from the Latino community;

200-

300 people used to attend the earlier meetings about the dump. Now, Rosa believes that
many feel discouraged because the process has been going on for so long without
resulting in any significant change. Rosa, on the other hand, reaches a different
conclusion: "I see every day that Laidlaw doesn't get the permit as a victory."

Padres' Relationship with Laidlaw
Padres' relationship with Laidlaw is a strained one for obvious reasons. In
addition to the fact that many in the community would like to shut Laidlaw down, the
community also resents the fact that money from a special tax on Laidlaw has never
reached Buttonwillow. During the last six years, Laidlaw has paid more than 5 million
dollars in a special tax for the impacted community. Although Buttonwillow is the closest
community to the dump and although Buttonwillow bears 93% of Laidlaw's toxic traffic,
all of the money has been spent in other areas of Kern County. According to Supervisor
Ken Peterson, the money “is used everywhere and nowhere specifically... It definitely

^ A notable exception is Dennis Palla, a farmer who used to live in Buttonwillow,
and one of the first people to fight Laidlaw back in 1985. Palla became involved when he
learned that the state planned to bring Superfund waste from Southern California to the
Buttonwillow dump. He sued the state and was successful.
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does not come back to Buttonwillow, and it seems all the other supervisors would rather
keep it that way."®
According to Larry Moxley, vice president of governmental affairs for Laidlaw,
"The entire express intent was that money be used for the impacted community and to
date that money has not been used for that purpose. If it had been, or even a portion of it
had been, we probably would have much improved relations with the community of
Buttonwillow." This is not necessarily true, at least not according to

Gloria Ramos-

Byrd, president of the Buttonwillow Chamber of Commerce: "Regardless of the money
Laidlaw gives to the community, that wouldn't change our minds that we didn't want this
facility when it came here ten years ago and we still don't." Regina Houchin, the town's
school board chairwoman, also believes that the community would be opposed to the
expansion, regardless of the amount of money Laidlaw contributed to the community:
"There's no price tag on your health and safety.”®
Although Buttonwillow has not received any of the special tax money, Rosa and
others argue that Laidlaw has still tried to buy off their community by donating
regularly to the school, supporting senior citizen events and helping to fund the school's
new computer room. Laidlaw also bought the community a batting cage, something the
community has wanted for a long time. Across the batting cage there is a sign reading
"Laidlaw." According to Rosa, one can literally see Laidlaw's influence all over the
com m unity.
Laidlaw's influence was definitely apparent during last year's Cinco De Mayo
celebration. Laidlaw donated money to the celebration by buying the tickets that are sold
to determine who will be crowned Queen. Each Cinco De Mayo ticket read, "Sponsored by

® Tom Maurer, "Kern gobbles Tax Meant for Small town," The Bakersfield
C alifornian 11 July 1994, 1. Instead of being spent directly in Buttonwillow, the tax
money has gone into Kern County’s general fund which pays for services like fire
protection, law enforcement, courts, parks and libraries.
® Ibid., 2.
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Laidlaw." When Rosa found out, she went to the school to express her anger that the
school was using its students to promote Laidlaw. Rosa received an apology with an
explanation that the School Board was unaware that Laidlaw was going to involve itself in
that manner. Rosa received many calls from people in the community who didn't
understand why the company they were fighting was sponsoring their celebration.
On the day of the celebration, many people did not attend because of Laidlaw's
interference. The superintendent blamed Rosa and falsely accused her of organizing a
boycott of the celebration. As a result, the

superintendent revoked Padres' privilege of

using the school free of charge to hold its community meetings; now, if the group wants
to use the building, it has to go through the official routes. This means that Padres has to
reserve the room a month in advance and pay 50 dollars an hour. Since Padres can't
afford this fee every time the group needs to hold a meeting, gatherings are held in
people's homes and backyards.
W hen Rosa was asked to describe Padres' relationship with Laidlaw, she
explained that she used to be the type of person who Inherently trusted people: "I always
thought that the government was there to protect you. I thought the EPA was there to
protect the public's health...I grew up being taught not to question." Her perspective
changed dramatically after she attended a Highlander training seminar^^ that taught her
to question her world, and Laidlaw: "Highlander took the blinders off and taught me that
you need to look out for your own community...! used to always see the best in people.
Now you have to distrust everyone until they prove otherwise. That's hard to do."
Now, as a teacher, she tries to share some of her insights with her students: "I
teach kids that they're supposed to respect adults but it's good to question. And if you
don't like something, do something about it."

“*0 Highlander Research & Education Center is located in New Market, Tennessee.
It provides training for social activists from labor, civil rights, social and economic
justice and environmental groups.
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Summary
Padres' fight to stop the expansion of Laidlaw's toxic waste dump is a good
exam ple of the grassroots environmental justice struggles that are taking place around
the nation. Like Padres, members of these community groups are not formally trained
activists or community organizers; environmental justice battles are most often fought
by concerned parents and residents of the impacted community who have organized
around the shared goal of protecting their children and their community from health
hazards associated with toxic substances and other environmental hazards. Like Padres,
most community groups are existing on extremely limited resources, while they face
opponents like Laidlaw who are economically and politically more powerful.
To provide a better understanding of the challenges that face grassroots
community groups in the environmental justice movement, the following chapter takes a
closer look at the events and issues surrounding Padres' struggle to stop the expansion of
Laidlaw's toxic waste dump.
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Communities disproportionately burdened with our nation's environmental
problems share a common profile; the vast majority are low-income and communities of
color. The town of Buttonwillow, host to one of California's three Class 1 toxic waste
dumps, fits this profile; the 1990 Census reveals that people of color represent slightly
more than sixty-one percent of the population (Latinos-slightly more than fifty
percent; African-Americans-eleven percent) and thirty percent of the households are
below poverty level. ^
W hen Laidlaw first proposed the expansion of its Lokern facility in October of
1991, Padres organized hundreds of Buttonwillow residents who attended public
hearings, rallies and protests to express their disapproval of the project. W hen the
permitting process was initiated, the Kern County Board of Supervisors appointed a
Local Assessment Committee (LAC)^ to review the project and negotiate with Laidlaw to
determine the conditions under which the proposed expansion would be "acceptable" to
the community.^

In June, 1992, after the LAC had met six times, the Board of

^ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1990 Census Of Population:
G en eral Population C haracteristics- California (Section I of 1111. (July 1992), 42.
(hereafter "1990 Census"). It should be noted that the percentage of people of color in
Buttonwillow is most likely greater because of the significant undercounting of people of
color in the 1990 census. See Citv of New York v. United States Department of
C om m erce. 34 F .3d 1114 (2d Cir. 1994). The 1990 census undercounted Hispanics by
5.2% . M l at 1121-1122. Historically, census figures have undercounted ethnic and
racial minority groups.
at 1117.
2 When a potential operator, such as Laidlaw, files a "Notice of Intent", the
county Board of Supervisors is required by state law to appoint a LAC to "Represent
generally, in meeting with the project proponent, the interests of the residents of the
city or county and the interests of adjacent communities." S ee Health and Safety Code
§ 2 5 1 9 9 .7((d)(2)(B)).
2 The LAC process has been defined as a "classic catch-22" by Padres' attorney,
Luke Cole. In a Title VI complaint written on behalf of Padres (discussed in more detail
later), Mr. Cole explains, "if the community takes part in the LAC process, it is seen as
signing off on the dump proposal; if it boycotts the LAC process, the dump could be
25
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Supervisor's representative, Planning Director Ted James, postponed the process
because the project lacked a Final Environmental Impact Report (EIR).'^ The Final EIR
was completed in approximately two years, and the LAC met again on September, 27,
1994.
W hen the LAC meetings resumed, so did the debate over the Spanish-speaking
residents' request for the translation of public notices, public hearings, and documents
relating to the expansion of the dump. The issue of translation was raised during the
first hearings in 1991 when Spanish-speaking residents expressed interest in
participating in the permitting process. Since the beginning of Padres' fight to stop the
expansion. Padres has argued that Spanish-speaking residents are being excluded from
the permitting process because they can not speak or understand English.
The translation issue peaked when the publication of the Final EIR appeared. At
that time, the LAC had one newly appointed member, a Latino resident from
Buttonwillow, Mr. Eduardo Montoya. Due to his limited understanding of English,
especially the technical language used in the EIR, the LAC, after significant deliberation
and debate, voted to request that the County translate, or allow the LAC to hire someone
to translate, the EIR into Spanish. When the request reached the Board, its members
voted unanimously against translation.

established with no mitigating conditions." S ee Before The United States Environmental
Protection Agency And The United States Department of Housing And Urban Development,
Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor, El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio, and Concerned
Citizens of Westmorland, Complainants, v. Laidlaw, Inc., Chemical Waste Management,
Inc., California Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Toxic Substances
Control, State Office of Permit Assistance, Kern County, Kings County, Imperial County,
San Joaquin Air Pollution Control District, Imperial County Air Pollution Control
District, Central Valley Regional W ater Quality Control Board, Colorado River Basin
Regional W ater Quality Control Boards, Respondents. Complaint Under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 40 C.F.R. Part 7 And 24 C .F.R . Part 1, at
9. [hereinafter Title VI Complaint].
^ Under the California Environmental Quality Act, the County is required to
prepare an EIR if the project might significantly affect the environment. This document
is crucial to the permitting process because it contains the Draft Environmental Impact
Report, public comments, comments from the state and local agencies and the County's
responses to the comments.
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Because the Board acted directly against the wishes of the LAC and the Spanish
speaking residents of Buttonwillow, the issue of translation remains a central point of
conflict. While the LAC contends that they need more time to review the Final EIR, the
Board argues that the LAC wasted time on the translation issue and subsequently failed to
properly carry out its duty to negotiate "acceptable" conditions with Laidlaw and the
com m unity.5
Padres and others claim that the County's refusal to translate vital information
relating to the project has illegally kept them from fully participating in the permitting
process. W hen the County failed to respond to over 200 letters written by Latino
residents in response to the project's Draft EIR ®, Padres accused the County of
environm ental racism;
W e ’ve been asking for two years for them to translate this information into
Spanish since 65% of Buttonwillow residents speak Spanish....They've always
refused to do that, but now they won't even respond to our comments. They are
excluding a lot of people from the process because they speak Spanish. That's
sim ple discrimination.^

Although the issue of translation initiated a heated debate between the County, the
LAC, Padres and others involved in the permitting process, this was by no means the

5 In this case the LAC process is under heavy scrutiny by both the County and
Padres. While the County argues that the LAC has unsatisfactorily conducted its job,
Padres' attorney, Luke Cole, argues that the LAC has not been given adequate time to
carry out its statutorily-mandated duties: "Local Assessment Committees empanelled in
other jurisdictions have taken between 18 months and four years to complete the
negotiations with facility proponents. The LAC in this case was given from September 27
to Decem ber 1 2 -a b o u t 10 weeks. This is a ridiculous schedule, and indicates to
impartial observers that the Board has no interest in what the LAC comes up with." See
Luke W . Cole & Anne Katten, Testimony on the Proposed Expansion of Laidlaw's Lokern
Facility (California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, Center on Race, Poverty and the
Environment, Decem ber 12 1994), 5 [hereinafter Cole & Katten, T e stim o n y].
G 276 letters were written by Buttonwillow residents which is the greatest
number of letters ever received in Kern County regarding an Environmental Impact
Report. Although 217 out of the 276 letters were written in Spanish, the County did not
respond to these letters. Padres' attorney, Luke Cole, is using this lack of response as
one reason to challenge the Final EIR.
1994,

^ Tom Maurer, "County Won't Exchange Words," Bakersfield Californian. 3 June
A1- A2.
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only concern raised by the community. Over 200 letters documented the residents' fear
that exposure to the dump may cause serious health problems including: birth defects,
miscarriages, sterility,

cancer, respiratory illnesses, headaches, and nausea. The issue

of health problems peaked during a period of eight months from 1992-1993, when two
babies were born in Buttonwillow with neural tube defects. Members of the community
feared that the defects were related to the dump. A representative from California Rural
Legal Assistance reported the community's concern to the California Birth Defects
Monitoring Program to initiate an investigation of the cluster.® Although the study did
not find a direct link between the dump and the birth defects, birth defects remain an
important health issue of concern to many residents of Buttonwillow.
The community is also concerned that an expansion would increase the potential
for air and water contamination, on-site accidents, chemical spills, and

traffic

accidents involving Laidlaw's trucks. This toxic traffic is especially dangerous because
the truck route passes directly by the town's elementary school.^
The fact that Laidlaw has a nationwide performance record of violations and
accidents makes Buttonwillow residents even more concerned about the potential dangers
associated with living near a toxic dump. Padres and its attorney have argued throughout
the permitting process that Laidlaw is a "convicted environmental criminal with a
horrendous and worsening record of compliance nationwide";^® for example:

® California Birth Defects Monitoring Program, Neural Tube Defects in Kern
Countv: Buttonwillow Area Cluster Investigation. (Novem ber 1993). This report
explains that neural tube defects "result when the neural tube (precursor of the spinal
cord/brain) fails to close, a process normally completed 1 month after conception.
Spina bifida and anacephaly are the two most common forms" (p.1).
® Truck traffic and the current route through town is a central issue addressed in
the Final EIR. One of the mitigation factors is that the trucks will be re-routed to a
different road that does not pass by the elementary school. Padres and others are
concerned that this new route will be impossible to enforce. There is additional concern
that if the dump is allowed to expand, traffic and air pollution will increase in a town
which already suffers from below-acceptable air quality.
1® Cole & Katten, Testimonv. 2.
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Laidlaw's 1992 Form 10-K , filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
reveals that Laidlaw is a potentially responsible party in 14

Superfund s ite s / ^

In 1987, Laidlaw was fined $350,000 at its Lokern facility in Buttonwillow for 14
violations, penalties of nuisance odors, non-compliance with all permit conditions,
and failure to conduct weekly inspections. On January 30, 1989, a spill of more
than half a million gallons of "non-hazardous liquids" occurred due to human error
and an inferior weld.'' ^
At its Cleveland, Ohio G SX Chemical Services Facility, Laidlaw's toxic incinerator
was shut down by the Ohio Attorney General's office and Ohio EPA after repeated
accidents, violations and fines. In a 1989 report, Ohio EPA Director Richard Shank
enum erated Laidlaw's problems: "Cyanide wastes in unmarked barrels, incompatible
wastes stored near each other, operating records were missing or had been taken
home by employees, 34,000 pounds of wastes received without any records. " He
concluded, "[Laidlaw's operation] is horrendous and shoddy...I never would have
dream ed that (Laidlaw) would get themselves into this kind of trouble...this is not
some corner drug store, this is a hazardous waste facility"^^
In 1991, Laidlaw was cited in Westmorland, California for a fire at the dump caused
by mixing incompatible wastes.
In Septem ber, 1993, Laidlaw was fined $1,825,000, for violations at its facility
in Pinewood, South Carolina, the largest environmental fine in the history of that
State.
In 1994, Laidlaw was fined $1,055,144.20 by the State of Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality for the following violations at its Crowley dump - three
fires, operating parts of the facility without permits, and illegally disposing of
hazardous waste in non-hazardous landfills."'®

Laidlaw's compliance record remains an issue of dispute between Padres and the
County. In the written testimony submitted by Padres' attorney it was argued that one of

Ibid., 27
12 For more information of Laidlaw's violations at its Lokern Facility, see State
of California Department of Health Services, Toxic Substances Control Program,
Inspection Report: Laidlaw Environmental Services (Lokern Facilitv) (April 1991) .
13 Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, Laidlaw: A Corporate Profile
(1 9 9 4 ), 7-8 [hereinafter C C H W , L a id la w ].
14 State of California Department of Health Services, Toxic Substances Control
Program , In the Matter of Laidlaw Environmental Services (Imperial Valiev). Inc..
Corrective Action Order and Complaint for Penalty (M ay 24, 1991).
1® Cole & Katten, Testim ony. 27-28; C CH W , Laidlaw .
1® State of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, In the Matter of
Laidlaw Environmental Services in Crowlev Louisiana. Penaltv Notice (January 26,
1994).
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the largest flaws In the Final EIR was its failure to consider Laidlaw's national and
international performance record. The EIR's Response to Comments claims that the
Board should only be concerned with Laidlaw's performance at its Lokern facility.
In addition to the County's failure to consider Laidlaw's compliance record,
Padres' attorney has enumerated many other reasons why the Final EIR is inadequate and
should be r e w r i t t e n . A l t h o u g h Padres and others feel that there has been an inadequate
review of the proposed expansion, and although the LAC argued that it needed more time
to complete its review of the EIR and negotiate with Laidlaw, the Board observed its
original deadline and voted in favor of the project on December 12, 1994."'®
Although Laidlaw has received initial approval from the Board, Padres continues
to fight against the expansion. On December 9, 1994 , Padres, along with two other
grassroots community groups from California, filed an environmental justice challenge
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Developm ent (HUD)."'® The administrative complaint, drafted by California Rural Legal
Assistance's Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment and the University of California
at Berkeley's Environmental Law Community Clinic,

alleges violations of Title VI,

in

17 Cole & Katten, Testim on v. 8-30.
1® In addition to the County's approval, Laidlaw must receive permits from the
State Department of Toxic Substances and Control(DTSC), the Central Valley Regional
W ater Quality Control Board and the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control
D is tric t.
1® Civil Rights complaints are a new strategy in the environmental field; the
first Title VI case was filed last year. It has been used primarily by community groups
in the south. This is the first such complaint to be filed west of Texas. These complaints
are being filed during a time when the Clinton Administration has officially shown
support for the environmental justice movement. In February, 1994 President Clinton
signed an Executive Order on environmental justice- (Executive Order 12898 of Feb
11, 1994: Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations
and Low-1 ncome Populations § 2-2, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7630-31 (Feb 16, 1994).
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the siting, permitting, expansion and operation of California's three Class 1 toxic waste
dumps.20
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, programs or activities which
receive federal financial assistance can not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or
national origin. The respondents named in this complaint — California Department of
Toxic Substances Control, Kern County, Kings County, Imperial County, Laidlaw, Inc.,
Chemical W aste Management, two water boards and two air pollution control districts —
all receive federal financial assistance from either the EPA or HUD and can therefore be
named in a Title VI complaint.
To win under Title VI one does not have to prove intent, but only show
discriminatory impact. The complainants conclude that:
...systematic, ongoing discriminatory impact is evident in three ways: 1) Latino
communities have 100% of the existing toxic dumps [in California], and will
live with the dangers and health consequences of the dumps every day; 2) When
Laidlaw and Chem W aste want to increase California's toxic dump capacity, they
look to the existing Latino communities already burdened by dumps, and propose
expansions or new facilities there. For example, in the past five years, Chem
W aste has sought to build a toxic waste incinerator at its facility and Laidlaw has
sought to expand the capacity of both the Buttonwillow and Westmorland dumps;
and 3) None of the local, regional, or state regulatory agencies take any steps to
require--or even e n c o u ra g e -a tte m p ts to handle problems of toxic waste
disposal without increasing the burdens on Latino communities. As a result,
Latino communities are a permanent target area for toxic waste dumps.21

To stop what Padres and others feel to be an obvious pattern of discrimination in
the permitting, siting, and operation of toxic facilities in California, the complainants
20 See Before The United States Environmental Protection Agency And The United
States Department Of Housing And Urban Development, Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor, El
Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio, and Concerned Citizens of Westmorland,
Complainants, v. Laidlaw, Inc., Chemical Waste Management, Inc., California
Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Toxic Substances Control, State Office
of Permit Assistance, Kern County, Kings County, Imperial County, San Joaquin Air
Pollution Control District, Imperial County Air Pollution Control District, Central
Valley Regional W ater Quality Control Board, Colorado River Basin Regional W ater
Quality Control Boards, Respondents. COMPLAINT UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT O F 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200D 40 C.F.R. PART 7 AND 24 C.F.R. PART 1.
21 Ibid., 51.
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conclude that "EPA and HUD should require the respondents to impose an immediate
moratorium on the siting and expansion of any toxic waste facilities in communities of
color in California, as a condition of continuing to receive federal financial
assistance."22

Summary
Padres is confronted with many significant obstacles; in addition to the fact that
its opponent is economically and politically more powerful, Padres also faces a system
that does not allow Spanish-speaking people the opportunity to fully participate in the
permitting process. The controversy surrounding the LAC and the translation issue is a
clear example of the different power struggles involved in the toxics debate; although the
LAC is supposed to represent the interest of the community, it has no true power. After
months of deliberation about the community's request for translation, the LAC voted in
favor of fulfilling that need. Nevertheless, in one meeting the County Board of
Supervisors voted unanimously to deny the request.
W hile Padres faces obvious opponents, including representatives of Laidlaw and
the County, there are other players that affect Padres' struggle for environmental
justice. The next chapter introduces the Kern County Health Department in an attempt to
understand its role in Padres' struggle. Although the Department is not directly involved
in the permitting process regarding the siting or expansion of toxic waste dumps, it still
affects Padres because, like most environmental justice battles, Padres' struggle is
deeply rooted in its desire to protect the community from toxics-related health
problem s.
Since the stated mission of the Department is to protect public health, one might
conclude that these two groups share a common goal. One might also reason that the

22 Ibid., 5. [For a more complete list of recommendations see pp. 51-54].
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Department's policies and actions would support the goals of Padres and the
environmental justice movement. However, interviews conducted with the Director of
the Department, Dr. Jinadu, reveal that the Department has not allied itself with groups
like Padres; instead, the Department's toxics policy, whether intended or not, creates
additional obstacles that Padres must overcome in its fight for environmental justice.
The work of the Department has not supported Padres because the groups' perspectives
towards toxics — what they define as the problem and what they define as the solution —
are vastly different. The following chapter takes a closer look at the Department's policy
and perspective on toxics.
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CHAPTER 3
The

Kern

County Public

Health

Departm ent

This chapter describes the fundamental character and perspective of the Kern
County Public Health Department (Department) by providing an overview of the
Department's "Mission Statement"

and its "Directory of Services." Next, the chapter

presents an interview with the Department's Director, Dr. Jinadu, to establish the
Departm ent’s perspective on toxics; although the Department's literature does not
specifically address the issue of toxics, the interview reveals that the Department has a
toxics policy that Dr. Jinadu believes is consistent with its overall mission to protect
public health.^ Finally, the chapter concludes with a case study of the investigation of
Rosamond’s cancer cluster to demonstrate the complexity of the toxics debate.

Mission Statement
The Department's "Mission Statement" establishes the following goals;
•

reduce the occurrence of preventable disease, disabilities, premature deaths and
promote wellness;

•

assess needs and close the gaps in health services and enhance access to care among
diverse population groups;

•

provide leadership in setting community public heath standards in reforming health
care into a coordinated, accountable, and affordable system which emphasizes access
to appropriate preventative measures and quality services;

•

maintain culturally appropriate education and public health promotion efforts;

iT h e information for this chapter was gathered from three sources;
1) Department's literature: Mission Statem ent and Directory of Services: 2) Dr.
M anzoor Massey, Director of the Kern County Public Health Department Division of
Health Promotion and Public Information, personal interview by author, 17 November
1994; and 3) Dr. Babatunde Jinadu, Director of the Kern County Public Health
Departm ent, phone interview by author, 17 February 1995.
34
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build and foster strong partnerships for health with local public/ private health and
social service agencies, community based organizations, consumers, educational
institutions and other interested community groups; and
improve the quality and cultural competency of the Department's operations,
services and programs.
working together as a team and making shared decisions (sic).

Directory of Services
The Department's "Directory of Services" emphasizes a commitment to making
quality health care accessible to everyone: "Kern County Department of Public Health is
dedicated to serving the public. Multi-lingual, culturally sensitive staff provide you
with a wide range of services...We are here to serve you."^ The following services are
listed in this directory. Additional information about some of the services is included to
gain a better understanding of the scope of the Department's activities.

- M edia Relations and Information

- H IV /A ID S Programs

- Health Statistics/Birth and Death Certificates

- Public Health Laboratory

- Preventative Health Care for the Aging (PHCA)

- Animal Control Services

C a lifo rn ia C hildren's Services (CCS)- C C S is a statewide program that
provides financial assistance to low-income eligible families with children who have
certain physical handicaps or severe illnesses.
C h ild

H ealth

&

D is a b ility

P reven tio n

(C H O P)

and

T re a tm e n t

P rogram .

The C H D P Program provides early health care to low-income eligible children
including a physical exam, hearing and vision screening, blood testing, W IC referral
and immunization. The goal of this program is to prevent the development of more
serious health problems later in life.

M atern al Child and A dolescent Health (M CAH)- There are several services
which concentrate on providing health care to women and children: 1)The Perinatal
Outreach Program (POP)conducts door to door outreach to locate women in need of
prenatal care. The program is intended to provide support services for a woman
throughout her pregnancy until the infant's second birthday: 2) The Comprehensive
Perinatal Services Program works with Medical providers to improve the delivery
of comprehensive perinatal services to medical eligible pregnant women; 3) Black
2 Kern County Public Health Department, "Directory of Services."
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Infant Perinatal Improvement Program focuses on serving preconceptual, pregnant
and post-partum African-American women in high risk areas in an attempt to
reduce infant mortality and improve birth outcomes; and 4)The Fetal/Infant
Mortality Review Project studies the health problems associated with fetal and
infant death to learn how to improve outcomes.

P u b lic

H ealth

N ursing

S ervices

•

- M u lti-lingual/m ulti-cultural staff work in
the clinics and also make home visits. Some of the services include: 1) Education
about the dangers associated with substance abuse during pregnancy; 2) Conducting
follow-up home visits for babies with special health problems such as congenital
defects, low birth weight, failure to thrive, or drug exposure; 4) Education about
how to prevent and control communicable diseases such as AIDS, TB, Giardia,
Salmonella and Hepatitis; and 5) Clinical services such as pregnancy testing, family
planning and immunizations for children and seniors.

•

C o m m u n ity

H e a lth P ro m o tio n /E d u c a tio n /R e s o u rc e s - " One s present
lifestyle is the best indicator of one's future health condition. Multi-lingual and
multi-culturally trained staff work with schools, churches, community based
agencies, clubs, sports organizations, and persons with special needs. They provide
the public with information, education and training to promote healthy lifestyles and
how to prevent disease." The following services are offered:

- Smoking prevention and cessation information
- Self-Help Quit Smoking Kits
- Assistance with developing smoke-free polices for businesses and communities
- Child health and disability prevention education
- Health promotion programs for seniors
- Consultation on health fair planning
- A ID S and other sexually transmitted disease prevention education
- Perinatal education program consultation
- Presentation on general public health- most subject areas included
- Information/education materials on most health topics
- Information to students on health issues
- Consultation on clinic patient education

Role of the Department in Buttonv^illow
In Buttonwillow, a nonprofit organization, National Health Services, Inc. (N H S),
operates a health clinic which provides the following services:
- primary preventive medical services

- comprehensive prenatal care
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- preventive and restorative dental care

- nutritional assessment and
counseling

- health education counseling

- psycho-social assessment and
counseling

- periodic screening of adults and children

- management of chronic medical
problems

- pharmacy and drug reaction services

- laboratory and x-ray services

- outreach and transportation

- family planning program

- individual managed care program

- on call 24 hour services.

- comprehensive pediatric, adolescent, adult
and geriatric care programs

As a general rule, if there is a primary care provider such as NHS already
established in a community, the Department will not duplicate services. If a community
does not have a primary care provider, the Department will try to find one for that
community; only as a last resort does the Department want to take on the responsibility
of providing primary care. According to the Director of the Department, Dr. Jinadu, this
is not the Department's role; instead, the "core functions of a public health department
are assessment, policy development and assurance.''^
In communities like Buttonwillow, where the Department is not the primary
care provider, the Department's role is one of surveillance and investigation of reported
diseases or "unusual" incidents. Under the state's Health & Safety Code, certain
communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases, must be
reported to the Health Department. In addition to reportable diseases, health care
providers as well as individuals in the community are expected to inform the
Departm ent about any "unusual " occurrences. It is then the Department's responsibility
to investigate.

3 Dr. Jinadu, Director of the Kern County Public Health Department, phone
interview by author, 17 February 1995.
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Currently neither NHS nor the Department has conducted a needs assessment to
determ ine the specific health problems and concerns of the Buttonwillow community.
The Department does not normally conduct needs assessments or maintain specific files
on individual communities the size of Buttonwillow. In Dr. Jinadu's opinion "the needs of
Buttonwillow are probably no more than the needs of other small towns." Dr. Jinadu also
explained that the Department would not spend resources to conduct a needs assessment
only on the town of Buttonwillow; instead, it would group Buttonwillow with other small
towns until the study group reached approximately 50,000 residents.
The Department does keep certain health statistics on its computer system such
as birth and death statistics and immunization records. The Department can gain access
to this information by entering a zip code for a specific area. For example, the
Department could enter Button willow's zipcode and find out how many children under the
age of two have been immunized. The immunization rate could then be compared to the
rate in other communities in the County or the state.
W hen asked if he feels the Department is adequately serving the needs of the
Buttonwillow community. Dr. Jinadu replied in the affirmative and when asked if he
would make any changes, he explained; "No. There is nothing that has come to our
attention to make that necessary."^

Relationship with Padres
The Department does not have a relationship with Padres; neither the Director of
the Department, Dr. Jinadu, nor the Director of the Division of Health Promotion and
Public Information, Dr. Massey, were familiar with this community group.

4 Ibid.
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Toxics Policy

To gain an understanding about the Department's toxics policy, segments of a
phone interview with Dr. Jinadu will be presented. Although Dr. Jinadu speaks with
confidence on this subject, the Department's actions and decisions have been criticized
by others involved in the toxics debate [an evaluation of the Department from the
perspective of two grassroots environmental justice leaders appears in the following
chapter]. The interview questions are in bold and Dr. Jinadu's responses are direct
quotes transcribed from a recorded phone interview.^

Does

the

D ep artm en t

have a toxics

policy?

Yes. This department is here to protect the public’s health. If any situation poses a
th reat the Department will be tfiere-if there is proof, if there is a connection (emphasis
added).

So, th e

proof has to com e first before you take action?

Absolutely. W hat does this facility do? Has it been proven to be hazardous? Is there any
scientific evidence that there is any more danger just because its toxic [or is it ] that we
all just don't want it? We don't get into the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) process. W e
deal with a scientific approach to issues along with looking at the community. Our role is
that of standing in between and not getting caught in any side. Just because something is
labeled "toxic" doesn't mean it is hazardous to public health.

In his opening statement, Dr. Jinadu establishes that the role of the Department
is to protect public health. He makes it clear that health officials follow a specific code of
conduct defined by their commitment to the practice of "science." In order to practice
this scientific approach to public health, he argues that health officials must remain
neutral, without taking any sides. Dr. Jinadu emphasizes this point throughout the
remainder of the interview as he develops the argument that the Department's approach
to public health must be objective in order to make sound public health decisions.

5 Ibid. Dr. Jinadu gave permission to record the interivew.
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His use of the term "threat" should be noted because It is followed by the clause
— "if there is proof, if there is a connection." If this phrase had been left out, one might
conclude that he is using the term "threat" to refer to situations that contain the
possibility or potential for a problem to occur. However, Dr. Jinadu explains that the
Departm ent will act on a situation only if there is "proof" that a threat exists. The
Department's demand for scientific certainty is one of the defining characteristics of its
toxics policy.

Do you th in k th a t th ere Is still a p o s s ib ility that en v iro n m e n ta l
c o n ta m in a n ts caused the birth defects in B u tto n w illo w even th o u g h
in v e s tig a to rs cou ld not prove there was a link?

the

Unless you have that data, unless anybody has that knowledge, you can't just conjecture.
That’s not scientific. Only oo with known scientific data. Ten years from now you might
find out that 'Oh yes the gasoline that we all use in our cars might cause birth defects.'
But we don't have the data now. And for all known data now and for all known information
there is nothing to make a cause/effect relationship (emphasis added).
You have to meet certain criteria to come up with a cause/effect relationship. If you
don't m eet those you can't say it is a cause effect relationship. In that regard, just
because you find these toxics here, and if you know that a toxic causes birth defects and
you find birth defects in the community you might say 'Oh wait a minute there's a strong
relationship here.' It’s still just a strong relationship. Because, let's say that the only
way that science has documented that it causes that defect is by ingestion and there is no
evidence that there was any ingestion in the subjects you've studied. You still can't make
that leap can you? Even though you may have documented that particular toxic causes
this defect, you still have to explain how it got there.

This question asks him to consider the "possibility" that environmental
contaminants may have caused the birth defects. As he explained in his response to the
previous question, the Department only recognizes a public health threat if there is
proof; a "possibility" does not qualify as a "threat."

A toxic facility does not represent a

public health threat unless a causal relationship exists.
In the following dialogue, Dr. Jinadu is asked to respond to specific questions
regarding the Rosamond investigation. In Rosamond, health officials found extensive
contamination, and yet, Dr. Jinadu still claims that these facilities are not a public
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health threat until there is "scientific" proof; a "strong relationship" is not enough.

At

this point in the Department's reasoning, the question that many would raise is: If you
know that these toxics are carcinogens, and you know that they are in the community,
isn't a “strong relationship" enough to make the Department recognize these
contaminated facilities as public health threats? Dr. Jinadu's responses to the following
questions indicate that his answer is definitely "no."

In the in v e s tig a tio n of R osam ond's childhood can cer clu ster, m any toxic
fa c ilitie s w e re found to be operating in vio latio n of the law. A lthough the
in v e s tig a to rs could not prove that exp osure to these fa c ilitie s caused the
c lu s te r, do you th in k these toxic fa c ilitie s rep resen ted a p u b lic health
threat?
No, not necessarily. That's a by-product of that kind of investigation. It's just like, you
know- How many people take their own bed sheets and mattresses and dump them on the
sidewalks?

W ait. Let me m ake sure I understand. W ould the D ep artm en t say
th is cas e th ese fa c ilitie s represented a p u b lic health th reat?

that in

No. Because how do you declare a public health threat?

34 S ites w ere found w hich required fu rth e r in v e s tig a tio n . Fence and Post
o rd ers w e re given at m any sites to protect the p ub lic from exp o su re to
to x ic ch e m icals. R eports of V iolation w ere issued becau se h azard ous
w aste w as being im properly stored, an above the ground ash pile was
fo u n d w ith elevated levels of heavy m etals and d io xin ...
W hat i'm trying to say to you is - What has that caused? In other words, when you
declare a public health threat what do you do ? Close down the town? (emphasis added)

Did the D ep artm en t
Rosam ond?

believe

that

this w as

a

public

health

th re a t

to

Well when you say public health threat you are now talking about something that you
know has jeopardized the life of the public.

Do you

believe that it did?

No.

No you

don't?
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No. W ater has never been damaged. The water system has not been contaminated. Nobody
has ever tested the air and said it was contaminated or otherwise everybody would be
dying of cancer not just the children. There has been no food product that has been tested
that people have consumed. So what is the definition of the public health threat? Let me
point out to you at this point that there were 13 cases of cancer in McFarland. Has any
toxic area been found? No. So what I’m trying to say to you is don't jump to conclusions.
First of all those toxic wastes that were found you have not even researched when it is
that it occurred. W as it before the law became more stringent? W as it after? W as it in
between. Before you can jump and say quid pro quid, quid pro quid, you have to be able to
prove. And it's all right to be sentimental about hazardous materials but when you are
working in an environment like this, you have to be objective (emphasis added).

Dr. Jinadu argues that the air must not have been contaminated because no test
results reached this conclusion, and if there was contamination "everybody would be
dying of cancer not just the children." Joan Mckee,

resident of 42 years, compiled a list

of adults who had gotten cancer: "Without even trying I came up with a list of 40
nam es...The people in Bakersfield (the Kern county seat) said they would be right out. I
never heard from them again." In frustration she destroyed the list. About three months
later she was diagnosed with multiple myeloma, a form of cancer which attacks the white
blood cells: "I got too sick to care any more. But I do believe my cancer is
environm ental."
Dr. Jinadu's reasoning goes beyond his initial argument that "scientific proof" is
needed; he also needs to have proof in the form of widespread cases of cancer. He then
raises the question: "So what is the definition of the public health threat?" He follows
this question with the advice that one should not jump to conclusions about the
significance of the toxic contamination. Once again he argues that you have to be able to
prove a causal relationship. His reasoning reveals that he does not follow his own advice;
when an investigation fails to uncover the cause, he "jumps to the conclusion" that the
toxic contamination did not cause the cancer cluster. Although he argues that the toxic
contamination does not represent a public health threat — unless there is scientific
proof that it does — he cannot "prove" that the toxics are nol threatening public health.
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In fact, he would probably argue that it is not his responsibility to provide that type of
evidence.
Determining who is shouldered with the burden of proof is an extremely
significant issue in the toxics debate. Should the community be responsible for proving
that toxics are a threat to public health, or, should the Department be responsible for
proving that they are not hazardous? This question applies to many different situations,
including the current struggle in Buttonwillow. Should the community have to prove that
expanding the toxic dump would be hazardous to their health? And if they are left with
the burden of proof, what type of proof would they have to provide? How many illnesses,
cancers, or birth defects would it take to convince officials that the facility is a public
health threat? The "burden of proof" issue will be addressed again in the following
chapters.

So, if you saw data that show ed a certain facility was em ittin g
co n ta m in a n ts th a t it w asn 't supposed to, that it w as leaking, sp illin g
site...
Shut it down. If you feel that way and its causing injury to the community, shut it down.

Although Dr. Jinadu answered quickly with the response "shut it down," he
remains consistent with the approach that it would have to be "causing" injury to the
public. There would have to be "scientific evidence" that the contaminated, leaking
facility caused injury to the public. This approach guarantees that people must be
harmed before taking action.

So once you have the proof then you take action?
That is correct
It’s one thing to go rah rah rah. It's another thing to put the objective
facts together. The value of maturity in practice is the ability to pul all facts together
and not get swayed by your own emotions. That is the value of maturity in practice. In
particular, in public health, you can not be somebody who is going to exaggerate. You
have to make very solid judgment calls that is going to be in the interest of the whole
community not your own personal interest. And you cannot be blasé about it. And you can
not be over-reactive about it. And a lot of people want us to be caught in either side. W e
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cannot. W e have to look at it from all sides and make very good, sound public health
decisions.
May you live long enough to work in a local public health department and then you can
put your idealism in there. But you'll find as 1 said to you that there are only certain
steps that you can take. The steps you can take are based on a sound judgment not on an
emotional high.

While Dr. Jinadu emphasizes the importance of making

"objective" decisions, he

devalues decisions based on an "emotional high." This perspective greatly influences his
responses to the recommendations made by Padres and SKRAP. When he suspects that the
comments are based on an "emotional high" he has justification for dismissing them.

C o n sid erin g the clu ster that occurred in Rosam ond and the num ber of
fa c ilitie s alre a d y in that tow n, should Rosam ond be burdened w ith yet
a n o th e r to x ic
fa c ility ?
W hy not? When you talk about toxics the idea is...because we use the word "toxic" or the
word "hazardous" there are standards already set in place. EPA has a standard. Class 1
hazardous material has its fingerprint, has its chemical nature, has agencies all the way
from a local health department to the federal government assessing what the chemical is
what the effects are, where should it be sited, should it be sited close to 35,000
residents...All those things are standards which are set in. if you have these standards,
and you are looking at these standards, people have come with those standards based on
the knowledge of that particular material. Then we get so caught up in - I don't want it in
my backyard because I know it is hazardous waste. That's not the job I'm in, O.K.? The
job is to know what are those factors just described. Is the chemical class 1? What
standards are there for its siting?

So you believe that as long as everyone follow s the rules, the EPA and
s ta te have set up ap p ro p riate standard s so th a t th ese fa c ilitie s , if run
c o rre c tly , do not pose a public h ealth threat?
That's why we live by standards.

In these last two sets of comments. Dr. Jinadu expresses his faith in the
"standards" developed by the EPA and the State. This trust in standards is consistent with
his commitment to "science." In both cases there is a recognizable lack of questioning. He
appears to be contradicting his earlier declaration regarding the importance of being
objective and knowing all of the facts; recognizing that data gaps exist, that standards can
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be inadequate, and that regulations can be broken, are all facts that he should
incorporate into his perspective and policy on toxics.

In R osam ond's case, studies w ere being done to see if there was a link
w ith th e c lu s te r and the to x ic fa c ilitie s . D u ring th e in v e s tig a tio n ,
a tte m p ts w ere m ade to sight yet another to xic fa c iiity in th at tow n. Can
you u n d erstan d w hy the com m unity fought hard to stop this proposal?
Yes. That's understandable for the community, but if you ask me - Does this pose any
more hazardous threat? - my answer is no. No, because there is no data for that.

Rosamond 's Cancer Cluster

In April 1986 the Department discovered a childhood cancer cluster in the small
desert town of Rosamond, located at the southern end of Kern County.^ During the years
1975-1984, nine children were diagnosed with cancer, the highest known childhood
cancer rate in California.^ Only two of those children are alive today. Five of the
children died of medulloblastoma, a rare cancer of the brain. According to statistical
calculations made by state health officials, the rate is six times greater than the state
wide average.®

6 The state defines a cancer cluster as a significantly larger than expected
number of cancer casees occurring in one place during a specific time period. This
cluster was discovered by accident when county health officials were reviewing records
in search of more information about another childhood cancer cluster in the town of
McFarland, California. See California Department of Health Services, Fact Sheet on the
Rosamond Cancer Cluster: California Department of Health Services, Rosamond Update:
Fact Sheet October 1988: Rosamond Update: Fact Sheet April 1989: and Rosamond
Update: Fact Sheet June 1989.
7 California Department of Health Services, Fact Sheet on the Rosamond Cancer
Cluster. Although nine children in Rosamond were diagnosed with cancer during the
years 1975-1984, the state only recognizes 8 cases as part of the cluster because the
ninth child lived greater than a mile away from the area where the other eight children
resided. Many people in the community argue that the other child should be included in
the cluster since he attended the same school.
® Ibid. According to the 1980 Census, there were 955 children in Rosamond at
that time. The statistical probability that 8 cancer cases would have occurred by chance
alone is 2/1000. The rate is 6 times greater than expected. The four medulloblastoma
cases are also a cluster. The statistical probability that 4 cases would occur in a town
the size of Rosamond by chance alone is 3/100,000.
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W hen the California Department of Health Services (DHS) joined the
investigation in November of that year, the Environmental Epidemiology and Toxicology
Section began to study the individual cancer cases to determine if they shared any
common characteristics. The Toxic Substances Control Division (TSCD) assisted by
investigating various sites in Rosamond and the nearby town of Mojave; officials
identified 34 sites which contained levels of contamination that required further
exam ination.
The early stages of the investigation revealed that state and local officials had
very little information about these sites. According to Charles White, chief of the state's
permitting unit, TS C D did not regularly inspect these sites because they were not
licensed as hazardous waste generators: "Basically these facilities realty came to our
attention in the past year and a half or so...We basically have been trying to get a handle
on whether they do produce hazardous wastes and trying to determine if they do comply
with the law and regulations." White pointed out that although these facilities are
generating hazardous wastes, they might be slipping through a loop hole in the law which
states that a permit is only required if hazardous waste is stored at the facility for more
than 90 days, or if the material is being recycled or treated.®
At the local level, the assistant chief of the Kern County Air Pollution Control
District (APCD), Cliff

Calderwood, explained that the District does not have information

about the extent of toxic contamination at these sites because APCD does not have the
authority to regulate toxic emissions. APCD also has minimal control over what is
burned in the furnaces, and no control over the management of solid wastes at these
sites: "We've cited virtually all of them out there at one time or another for various
types of problems, but we haven't looked at toxics. W e don't have the authority to do so."
Calderwood also drew attention to the fact that the owners of the sites may not even know

® Tony Knight, "Plants Lack Waste Permits,"

Dailv News

9 October 1988.
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what their facilities are emitting; "I don't know if those people know what it is they are
burning half the time."^ °
Calderwood argues that Rosamond's problems are a direct result of the fact that
Kern County's regulatory controls governing the burning and disposing of waste
materials have historically been much weaker than those in nearby Los Angeles County.
Since Rosamond is located only 85 miles north of Los Angeles' waste generators,
Calderwood explains that the town became a "convenient dumping ground" for hazardous
wastes from Los Angeles; "You are looking at 40 or 50 years of God knows what out
there, and maybe now w e’re paying for it. Until recently it was anything goes out there."
Kenneth Hughes, hazardous waste specialist with TSCD, supports this claim; "I have
never seen this much waste in one town before. The amounts and concentrations are
alarm ing."^ "•
In October, 1988, the state published a fact sheet to update the community on the
status of its investigation. The update provided summaries of the 34 sites, including
information on the contamination that was found. The state identified 6 sites with
elevated levels of dioxin, 20 sites with heavy metals (13 contained "elevated levels" of
heavy metals), and 8 sites with semi-volatiles. There were nine sites where the state
decided not to collect samples because "there was no indication of contamination."
Officials issued two Fence and Post orders, identified 11 sites that required additional
sampling, filed Proposition 65 reports for 10 sites, and referred one site to the federal
EPA for Fencing and Posting and containment of dioxin contaminated soils and waste.‘•2
In April 1989, the state released another fact sheet to provide the latest
information on the sites still under investigation. At that time the state announced that it

10 Ibid.
11 Louis Sahagun, "Rosamond; Malignant Mystery," Los Angeles Times 30
S eptem ber 1988, 1.
12 California Department of Health Services, Rosamond Update; Fact Sheet
O ctober 1988.
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had still not been able to find a medical link between the contaminated sites and the
cluster. The state announced that the investigation would continue in order to determine
whether clean up was necessary. In addition to studying the sites around Rosamond, the
state also conducted tests which sampled soil, eggs and pork to see if dioxins had blown
off sites and spread throughout the community.
In June 1989 the state published a fact sheet which contained the following
results from these studies:
•

Overall, the soil is safe. Only one location was found where the soil contained higher
levels of dioxin in an amount that may be cause for concern. DHS is conducting more
tests on that location.

•

The pork sample contained no more dioxin than pork from a supermarket. The level
is extremely low and is not a cause of concern.

•

Chicken egg samples from three local backyards contained higher levels than those
found in a supermarket. While the Rosamond supermarket eggs contained a dioxin
level of .Ip p t, the three sites had levels of 35.7 ppt., 3.2 ppt and 2.0 ppt. The state
recommended that the residents at the site measuring 35.7 should not eat or sell the
eggs, while the people at the other sites should limit their intake of eggs to 3-4 a
week.

•

DHS has found nothing to date that would connect dioxin exposure with any of the
childhood cancer cases.

In this same Fact Sheet, DHS responded to the following question: What can DHS
tell us about the cancer risks from the industrial sites now?:
To date there have not been any unusual contaminants detected in the soil samples
collected away from hazardous waste sites under investigation by the Toxics
Substances Control Division. No unusual contaminants were detected in soil and
water sample collected at locations where children with cancer spent time. These
sam ples however may not be representative of air exposures that occurred
during the years before the children developed cancer.

After commenting about the lack of data on air exposures, DHS explained that it
hired two consulting firms to help estimate the amount of chemicals that people may
have been exposed to before and during the time of the cancer cluster; one firm set up
meteorological stations to collect information on wind speed and direction while the
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Other firm reviewed the industrial processes to estimate the amount of contaminants
that may have drifted from the sites into the community. DHS explained that it will use
this data to conduct its exposure assessment study: "DHS toxicologists will use the
estimated exposures to calculate the theoretical cancer risk they pose to the community.
These calculations will allow DHS to determine if the cancer risk from environmental
contaminants is large enough to account for the childhood cancer

c lu s te r." ^

3

W hen the investigation came to a close, TSCD provided a final summary of the
sites;
11 sites have been ordered by the Department (DHS) to Fence and Post their
properties, 10 have complied. Those not in compliance face enforcement action;
4 sites have been referred to and accepted by the EPA for further stabilization; 2
felony cases are being developed for referral to the Attorney Generals Office; 13
generator inspections have been performed resulting in 12 Violation Notices...6
of those served with Violation Notices have already voluntarily complied; those
not in compliance ultimately will face enforcement action.

After the state conducted its investigation, Ron Baker, information officer for
T S C D , declared Rosamond a "safe" place to live: "It's probably one of the safest places.
No other community in the state has undergone such an investigation.""''^ Although
health officials concluded that whatever caused the cancers was either gone or never
existed, some community members thought the investigation was inadequate. Roberta
Bishop, one of the leaders of SKRAP, felt dissatisfied: "I don't think we have any answers.
I'm disappointed. I just don't feel like we're getting the whole story...Maybe we won't
ever know what caused those cases, but I want to know how things are now. Are my
children safe?''"'^ She challenges the claim that Rosamond is a safe place to live: "How
can it be safe? Dioxin causes cancer and they found dioxin. How can they say now that it

13 California Department of Health Services, Rosamond Cancer Studv Update
June 1 9 8 9 .
1^ Nancy W eaver, "Cloud of Suspicion Splits Tiny Town,"

Sacramento Bee 24

July 1989,
A-12.
15 Mindy Taylor Lewis, "Questions remain in Rosamond," Antelope Valley Press
16 June 1989,

A-6.
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didn't cause the cancer cluster? When you tell people it's safe, I wonder how much of it
is for the developers?"^®
Dave Kiefer, owner of a local feed store and member of SKRAP, expressed his
frustration with the investigation: "I feel like I've run up against a big tremendous wall
and there's nothing to do...We're concerned about the health and safety of everyone even
if they don't like it." Carol Raanes, a mother who considered moving to protect her
children raised the point that there are others in the community who are eager to put an
end to the investigation and the testing: "The old timers in town want everybody to shut
up. They want it over with. Rosamond is growing so fast they'll cover it over."^^
W hile many in the community expressed their frustration with the
investigation, there were others who felt differently; Bob Matley of the Rosamond
Cham ber of Commerce was happy with the results: "Yes, we are happy with the results
and, yes we are ready to put this behind us. It appears to be winding down. The
Developers are all back on the job." For some residents the investigation supported their
theories that there was never really a problem in the first place;

Art Landsguard,

owner of Karl's Hardware and Century 21 real estate business in town, argued, "There's
no proof we have an extra-large incidence of cancer here, "while his son and other
business leaders offered another explanation: "It's a possibility that drug abuse is the
cause." A mother of one of the victims vehemently disagreed while pointing out that her
child was three and a half years old when she was diagnosed with Wilm's tumor, a type of
kidney cancer,

These comments demonstrate the diversity of perspectives in the toxics

f® W eaver, "Cloud of Suspicion Splits Tiny Town," A-12. See Sahagun,
"Rosamond: Malignant Mystery." — The state's investigation and initial findings did
affect development projects in Rosamond. Rosamond was growing steadily as developers
saw the opportunity to accomdate the needs of people from Palmdale and Lancaster, two
of the fastest growing cites in the country. Kaufman & Broad the largest home builder in
California halted plans to build a multimilion dollar proposal to build 700 homes on
127 acres in Rosamond until the results were in from the state's investigation. Since
1984 when the last cancer was diagnosed, the town has grown from 4,000 to 15,000.
f 7 Ibid.
f® Sahagun,

"Rosamond: Malignant Mystery," 3.
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debate; while some residents challenged the investigation, others were satisfied with the
results. The following section discusses some of these different perspectives in more
detail.
The Rosamond investigation followed a particular pattern and order of events:
health officials discovered (by accident) a cancer cluster that triggered an investigation;
the investigation revealed elevated levels of toxic chemicals, some of which were known
carcinogens; health officials searched for the cause of the cluster but they could not find
any

"scientific" proof that a link existed between the contaminated sites and the cluster;

the cause was never found and health officials declared the town "safe." Many residents
were left with unanswered questions and a feeling of frustration. This pattern is not an
isolated example; during the years 1981-1992, the California Birth Defects
Monitoring Program completed 99 studies, and in the seven cases where officials
discovered an "unusual excess" of birth defects, they were unable to identify the cause.
In Kern County, the Department has been involved in three investigations — Rosamond,
Buttonwillow and McFarland — where the health officials could not prove that
environmental contaminants caused the clusters.
This pattern persists because the primary role of health officials in these
investigations is to "scientifically prove" that specific environmental contaminants
caused a certain cancer cluster, birth defects cluster, or other health problem
associated with exposure to toxic chemicals. If they are unable to prove that a link
exists, they conclude that the community is "safe" from the threat of toxics. In the
Rosamond investigation health officials expressed confidence in the results of their
investigation: "It is probably one of the safest places. No other community in the state
has undergone such an investigation."19
This conclusion indicates that health officials use the following reasoning: if an
investigation cannot prove that exposure to toxic chemicals caused the problem, then the
19 W eaver, "Cloud of Suspicion Splits Tiny Town," A-12.
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community is "safe." Heath officials base this type of reasoning on the assumption that a
public health investigation is capable of proving a link between the contaminated toxic
facilities and the cluster. In the Rosamond investigation there are several reasons why it
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish this link. At best, health
officials had extremely limited data on the toxic facilities. They did not have the answers
to the following questions: What toxic chemicals were being used, produced or released
during that time?; W hat volume of toxics were the facilities emitting?; Did any spills,
accidents, or illegal discharges occur?; If so, when? These questions only represent a
partial list of the unknown variables in this investigation; health officials also had no
way of accounting for all of the factors that may have affected when, where or how a
child was exposed.
In addition to the unknown variables associated with this particular
investigation, data gaps also exist that affect any public health investigation associated
with toxics. The data gaps are due to the inadequate testing of chemicals currently on the
market; many of these toxic chemicals are being used even though they have not been
tested for their potential to cause a variety of health problems, including cancer, birth
defects, endocrine disruption, damage to the nervous system, and damage to the immune
system. For example, there are more than 50,000 chemicals already in commercial use
that have not been tested for their ability to cause birth defects. In addition, more than
500 new chemicals are introduced into commercial use each year^O Tests are also not
done on the possible synergistic and cumulative effects of these chemicals. Scientists
simply do not know the complete profile of these chemicals. As a result, health officials
make decisions and policies without a true understanding of the possible consequences of
their actions. Although health officials are aware of the data gaps, they remain loyal to
this approach to toxics. The earlier review of the Department's toxics policy
20 Environmental Research Foundation, "Birth Defects...Part 2; Why Birth
Defects Will Continue to Rise," Rachel's Environmental & Health W eekly 4 1 1( 13
O ctober 1994).
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demonstrated that the Department shares this approach; in fact, Dr. Jinadu argues that
it is the responsibility of all public health officials to base their actions and decisions on
the presence or absence of "scientific data."

Summary

Dr. Jinadu's interview reveals that the Department bases its decisions, actions
and policies on the "objective" facts revealed through the practice of “science." One
must not "conjecture," "jump to conclusions," "exaggerate," "over-react" or make
decision based on an "emotional high." The Department will not define a situation as a
public health threat unless there is "scientific" evidence that establishes a causal
relationship. This policy on toxics places the burden of proof on community groups like
Padres and SKRAP to demonstrate that the toxic facilities in their communities caused
the various illnesses. In other words, toxic sites are innocent until proven guilty.
The question that remains is: How has the Department's toxics policy affected
Padres' and other community groups' fight for environmental justice? Do these groups
feel that the Department is living up to its commitment to protect public health?
It will become clear in the next chapter that Padres and SKRAP both have serious
concerns about the role of the Department in their communities; one of the primary
problems is that a cancer cluster, birth defects cluster or other serious illness has to be
reported before any action is taken by the Department. As a result of this policy, there
is no commitment to illness prevention through toxics use reduction or other pollution
prevention measures. Interviews were conducted with Rosa and Stormy to give them an
opportunity to evaluate the Department. Their comments and recommendations appear in
the following chapter.
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Evaluation of the Kern County
Public

Health

Departm ent:

A

G rassroots

P ersp ective

Although there are a variety of ways to evaluate the Department, the purpose of
this chapter is to establish how the Department performs with respect to community
concerns. Interviews were conducted with the leaders of two grassroots community
groups from Kern County — Rosa Solorio-Garcia of Padres and Stormy Williams of
SKRAP.'* In order to gain important background information regarding their previous
experiences with the Department, they were asked to respond to the following questions:
1) W hat relationship do you and your group have with the Department?; and 2) W hat
role does the Department play in your community? The chapter concludes with a list of
Rosa's and Stormy's recommendations for the Department. Their comments and specific
recommendations reveal that their perspectives towards toxics are significantly
different from that of the Department.

Relationship with the Department
Padres

Padres does not have a formal relationship with the Department, and since the
group has had no direct interactions with the Department, the question was modified to
read as follows: Would Padres be willing to establish a working relationship with the
Department? Do you think it would be beneficial? Is it feasible?
Rosa described why a relationship with the Department could benefit her
com m unity:

^ Rosa Solorio-Garcia, personal interview by author, 10 November 1994.
Stormy Williams, phone interview by author, 4 January 1995.
54
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For Latinos, if it is information about their health or about their children,
especially their children, they are going to go. The majority of the people
involved in this are involved because they want something better for their
children. There's nothing more important than their children. Latino families in
Buttonwillow don't have money. They don't have luxuries. The most important
thing in their lives are their kids.

At the same time, she questioned whether establishing a relationship with the
Department would be feasible. One of the barriers she identified was the lack of time:
If I were a full-time housewife with access to a phone and was able to establish
relationships with the Health Department and agencies involved in the permitting
process, then I would say- yes, it is feasible to set up a workshop on the
different health risks or just one on what the Departm ent can do for a
community. But I think the way we do things, we only react to what happens. W e
don't have long term goals because we are all full-time workers.

She explained that the group was able to work with more people when Lupe
Martinez from California Rural Legal Assistance was helping them organize. He helped
arrange for people from California EPA and others to come to Buttonwillow: "He made
them aware that we existed. They came to my house and talked to the group and we were
able to ask them questions. "
Later in the interview, Rosa identified another barrier that would affect the
feasibility of establishing a working relationship with the Department. She explained
that she would have to consult the group "to see if it was a risk they would be willing to
take." At this time in the interview, Rosa was discussing the group's concern about lead
exposure in the community. One of the members of Padres had been to a clinic to get her
three year old daughter examined. The nurse asked whether she wanted her daughter
tested for lead exposure and although she didn't know what that meant, she agreed to the
testing. The nurse told her that there was a problem because her child had a blood level
of "12." The mother wanted to know what to do but the nurse explained that the
Departm ent could not conduct further investigations until the child tested at a high level
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three consecutive times. The mother left the clinic extremely upset with many
unanswered questions that she brought to Rosa.
Rosa and this woman have been talking about possible ways to protect her child
from further exposure but Rosa explained that lead is a very sensitive subject, one that
could potentially create problems if Padres decided to seek assistance from the
Departm ent:
If we said that we wanted an investigation to see about lead exposure, and then
they found that most of the houses had lead, the town's going to turn against us
because there is nowhere else to live. And the farmers are going to turn against
us because we are upsetting their farm workers who live in their ugly old houses
even though they have lead. We're still being rebel-rousers. I mean, I don't care
but I think the other guys (member of Padres) who live in company houses...1
don't know whether people would rather expose their kids to lead or whether
they're just happy they have a home to live in...But I think people need to be
informed and the Health Department should be doing that.

The lead issue reveals the complexity of the problems that face communities like
Buttonwillow. Lead is more than just a health issue. People are faced with a choice; Lose
your home or poison your children? This is one more example of how the unequal
distribution of political and economic power affects farmworkers and other
disempowered population groups. Within this context, understanding the role of the
Department becomes more difficult. Although the Department paints a very black and
white picture to demonstrate how it bases its decisions and policies on the objective
practice of "science," Padres and SKRAP both feel that political pressures greatly
influence the Department. Political pressures and their effect on the Department are
discussed in more detail in chapter 6.

SKRAP

Stormy's first contact with the Department occurred in 1986 when public health
officials cam e to her house to test the water. When Stormy began to ask questions, they
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gave her "very vague responses' and wouldn't tell her whv they were conducting tests.
They informed her that they would contact her with the results. After waiting weeks
without hearing from the Department, she decided to call. The first time she called, she
got "the total run around. ' She called a second time and was still given no response to her
inquiry. According to Stormy, the third time she "got belligerent" and was finally told
that her water was "o.k.."
Approximately two years later she had a communication with Dr. Jinadu which
resulted in a strained relationship that has lasted to this day. She contacted the
Department in search of a risk assessment document; the document concerned a cement
company that was given a conditional use permit to burn toxics for a year in the nearby
town of Mojave. This permit was approved without an Environmental Impact Report or
public hearings; as Stormy explains, it was "snuck in." When she asked Dr. Jinadu to
send her a copy of the risk assessment document, again she "got absolutely the total run
around." He questioned her reasons for wanting the document and suggested she try to
contact the company or the contractor. She didn't want another list of people to call
especially because she knew that the company and the contractor were not required by
law to provide her with the document. She did feel, however, that the Department was
obligated as public health employees: "I explained [to Dr. Jinadu] that this is a health
related issue. The town already has the largest [childhood cancer] cluster and now
they're trying to add another toxic facility which would add 40,000 tons of toxics per
year to our air."
He told her to call others, and if she still couldn't get the paper, she could call
him back. She replied, "No sir. I will not be calling you back because I will not have any
reason to deal with you in the future." She further explained in the interview: "That is
the type of attitude, We're getting paid to be public servants but don't bother us.' "
After that experience she spoke to others who had interacted with Dr. Jinadu.
They told her that he typically spends a lot of time visiting clinics to immunize children;
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they argued that he should be spending more time concentrating on improving public
health policies. Stormy responded:
I think its good that any kind of doctor stays in touch with the grassroots. But
when you have 7 dead kids here and a big cluster in McFarland and another one
brewing up the road in Earlimart and you’ve got toxic sites all over the place...!
don't think he's ever been up here to have a tour of these sites. I don’t think he
cares. And I don’t think these people want to be out in the dirt. I think they want
to be in their offices. They don't consider our feelings. And when you are going to
start to add toxics into an area where we've got all these kids dead and you can't
even get a m em ber of the public an important piece of paper, I just find it
ridiculous. And I have nothing to do with that person. He'll come and sit next to
me in meetings and I'll just pretend he's not there because I just feel this is such
an unconscionable attitude, and how do people like that get these jobs anyway?

The experience with Dr. Jinadu made a lasting impression on Stormy, one that
makes her turn away from the Department as a potential source for assistance: "Because
of that experience with Jinadu, I certainly wouldn't have gone to Bakersfield to enlist
their aid because I felt like they were totally out of it."

What Role Does the Department Play in Your Community?
P a d re s

Rosa could only recall one time that the Department became involved in the
Buttonwillow community: "Dr. Jinadu, he came out here and right off he said that he
didn't think Laidlaw had anything to do with the birth defects in Buttonwillow. W e asked
if he had done any studies and he said, no.” Dr. Jinadu visited around the time that the
California Birth Defects Monitoring Program was called in by the state to investigate the
birth defects cluster in Buttonwillow.
Rosa explained that Dr. Jinadu's comment in support of Laidlaw and the state's
study that failed to find the cause of the birth defects made Padres' lose credibility in the
community: "We tell them that Laidlaw is bad, that these kinds of health problems are
happening and we feel that it is because of Laidlaw. The Department came and did a study
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but none of it showed that it was Laidlaw. So they (Buttonwillow residents) didn't
believe us after that." In fact, Padres feels that the opposite message was sent: "Once
they cam e in, it just gave Laidlaw added fuel because now they have a study which showed
that Laidlaw was a good company."
Although the birth defects cluster triggered a study by the state, Padres initially
wanted the local Department to conduct a needs assessment in Buttonwillow that would
exam ine all of the major health problems in the community; Padres was aware that it is
extremely difficult to prove that exposure to toxics caused the birth defects.
Nevertheless, with respect to toxics, Rosa wants them to address the issue even if they
don't have absolute proof:
I would want them to say if there are chemicals that can cause birth defects by
smelling them, if they're in the water, whatever, I want them to say that to the
community. I would want them to hold an informational meeting. It would have to
come from the Health Department saying that these are possibilities- Once you
know these things are possible, would you still want Laidlaw there?

In the interview, Rosa concluded that the Department is not in touch with the
Buttonwillow community, and that it doesn’t care :
The role of the Departm ent in Buttonwillow has been zero....M y thing is, they
don't want people to know there are problems, like all the lead in homes, because
the majority of the homes are owned by farmers in Buttonwillow. They're owned
by businessmen who are going to complain to the Department. So if all these
people in low-income housing don't know about it, they won't complain to
anybody and they'll live there forever. Who cares? 1 just think it is another way
of oppressing people.

SKRAP

In Stormy's opinion, the Department did the "very minimal" amount of work in
the investigation of the cancer cluster, especially considering this was the worst
childhood cancer cluster in the state. Soon after the cluster was discovered, the
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Department backed out for financial reasons and the state and federal agencies took the
lead. Stormy questions the priorities of the County:
I'm disappointed in the County. I know that one or two or three of them would
show up at the meetings the state held and they'd come all duded up and sit and
listen and kind of make an appearance. But as far as I know they were always
playing poor. And then they go ahead and build that huge new building for the
Supervisors and the administrative offices with marble. And I feel that 7 dead
kids are a higher priority than black marbled bathrooms.

W hen asked if the Department is still involved with the Rosamond community,
Stormy replied that she was unsure: "there may be a few still skulking around."
She continued to discuss Dr. Jinadu: "He wants to be in touch with every day people but
wouldn’t he want to come and look at these sites, go through the paper work and see how
this happened and figure out how to avoid it. To my knowledge I don't know what those
people in Bakersfield know."
Although the Rosamond investigation came to an end, parents still go to Stormy
in search of answers, explanations about what could have killed their children. Stormy
feels that these parents have a right to get these answers from their public health
officials: "I would pay for someone from the Department to take a tour. Maybe they could
speak to some of these parents because we have very haunted people here. I find it
unconscionable that we can't get a report, any interest shown, any compassion shown for
any of these families."

Recommendations
The following recommendations were compiled from comments made by both Rosa
and Stormy.
1 ) Develop and implement a policy/strategy to address toxics. This policy towards
toxics should officially recognize toxic facilities as a public health threat and
support pollution prevention and toxics use reduction.
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2 ) Be a resource for grassroots groups who are seeking Information on toxics and other
environmental health related problem such as lead exposure.
3 ) Hold public meetings in the impacted communities to provide residents with the
opportunity to ask questions and express their concerns regarding toxic facilities
and other public health problems.
4 ) Become more active in the permitting process. When grassroots groups are
attempting to stop the siting or expansion of toxic facilities, attend public hearings
to provide information about potential health problems associated with exposure to
toxics. Adopt a precautionary approach to toxics which recognizes that exposure to
toxics represents a public health threat even if hard scientific data hasn't linked
specific health problems with a specific facility.
5 ) Become more accessible to members of grassroots groups who are trying to promote
illness prevention and toxics use reduction in their communities. Currently,
members of these groups feel no connection with the Department and are unaware of
the Department's role in their community. The Department should communicate with
these groups to determine how the two parties can create and sustain effective
working relations. Public health officials should visit the community, m eet with
community leaders, and take a tour of the toxic facilities.
6 ) Assign a person to deal specifically with toxic-related issues. The employee would be
responsible for maintaining files containing information on the toxic facilities in
each community. The files would keep records regarding: 1) the name and amount of
all the chemicals at each site; 2) the name and quantity of chemicals being stored,
treated, and emitted ; 3 )the regulatory record of each facility including information
on violations, accidents, spills etc. The employee would also be responsible for
keeping the Department updated on any proposals for siting a new toxic facility or
expanding an existing facility. In addition, the employee would stay in direct contact
with the state and federal agencies involved in the regulation of these facilities. The
data collected about these facilities would be extremely useful if a cancer cluster or
other health problems appeared.
7 ) Conduct follow-up investigations in communities that have suffered from cancer
clusters, birth-defect clusters or other health problems that are suspected to be
linked to exposure to toxic chemicals. This follow up work should include providing
counseling services to the parents and families who are suffering from the loss of a
family member or friend. These people often have questions that have not been
answered and they could benefit from a meeting with pubic health officials.

Summary
Both Padres and SKRAP believe that the Department should be doing more to
support the goals of toxics use reduction and pollution prevention. They reason that the
Departm ent is obligated to address this issue since its mission is to protect public
health. The lack of absolute "scientific" proof should not be used as an excuse for non
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action. Padres and SKRAP believe the Department should play a more active role in their
communities. Rosa feels that the Department's role has been "zero" in her community,
while Stormy's experiences have left her with the impression that the Department
doesn't have any compassion or concern for her community.
The testimony from Rosa and Stormy challenge the fundamental arguments made
by the Departm ent in the previous chapter. Is illness prevention really the
Department's highest priority? If so, does the Department's toxics policy achieve this
goal? Is the Department committed to its stated mission to "build and foster strong
partnerships for health" with the communities it serves? If so, why are the
Department's relationships with Padres and SKRAP so strained? Is there a chance that
the Department and Padres can develop an effective working relationship? These
questions are examined in more detail in the following chapters.
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C hapter
The

Departm ent's

5
Response

This chapter contains the Department's responses to the recommendations made
by Padres and SKRAP. The Director of the Kern County Public Health Department, Dr.
Jinadu, agreed to participate in a recorded phone interview in order to accurately
present his opinions. There were a few times that additional questions were raised to
clarify his position. These questions along with the recommendations appear in bold. The
responses to these recommendations are direct quotes from Dr. Jinadu.

1)

D e v e lo p and im p lem en t a p o lic y/s trateg y to ad d ress to x ic s . T his policy
to w a rd s to xics sho uld o ffic ia lly reco g n ize to x ic fa c ilitie s as a public
h ealth th re a t and su p p o rt p o llu tion p reve n tio n and to x ic s use
r e d u c tio n .
The County has a strategy and policy towards toxics. However, it is not in the best
interest, or it is prejudicial to assume that all toxics are quote unquote public health
threats. Within standards and within acceptable measures the Department and the
County will evaluate each facility and determine the potential of such toxics.

Do you see any barriers that would make
D e p a rtm e n t to p erform such duties?

It d iffic u lt fo r

the

No I don’t see any barriers. But I also don't think it’s appropriate to just give a carte
blanche definition or request that every situation be declared a public health threat.
That is very impractical and very prejudicial. It's also appropriate to make it clear
that none of these recommendations are anything new. The County is doing everything
along those lines. But at the same time, what is perceived as what should be done and
what should actually be done may be two different things.

Padres and SKRAP want the Department to adopt a precautionary approach that
recognizes toxics as a threat to public health. The main message in this recommendation
is the need for the Department to develop a toxics policy that will focus on preventing
tragedies like the one experienced by Rosamond's residents. Communities shouldn't have
to suffer from cancer clusters and other serious illnesses to get attention from health
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officials. Making efforts to clean up toxic contamination after the fact is not enough; Rosa
and Stormy want the Department to address the long term goal of pollution prevention.
Dr. Jinadu's response to this recommendation does not address the issue of
pollution prevention and toxics use reduction. Instead, he is quick to imply that the
Department's current policy is adequate because the Department and County will
evaluate each facility . He remains firmly committed to his argument that toxics are not
a public health threat unless there is scientific evidence to prove a causal relationship.
As a result, his statement, "within standards and within acceptable measures," means
that facilities will not be evaluated unless there is proof they have caused a problem in
the community.
W hen Dr. Jinadu argues that it would be impractical and prejudicial to "declare"
all toxic facilities a public health threat, I suspect that he misunderstood Rosa's and
Stormy's point. To "declare" and to "recognize" represent two very different actions;
Rosa and Stormy want the Department's actions and policies to reflect an understanding
that these facilities are potentially dangerous to public health. They want the
Department to learn from tragedies like the one experienced in Rosamond instead of
continuing to assume that all toxics facilities are innocent until proven guilty.
While Rosa and Stormy have clearly expressed that the Department needs to
change, Dr. Jinadu's responses indicate that he is confident in the Department's current
approach to toxics. He gives no indication that change of any kind is necessary; in fact, he
claims that the Department already addresses the needs defined by Rosa and Stormy: "It's
also appropriate to make it clear that none of these recommendations are anything new.
The County is doing everything along those lines."

2)

Be a reso u rce fo r g rassroots groups who are seekin g in fo rm atio n on
to x ic s and o th er en viro n m en tal health related problem such as lead
e x p o s u re .
The Department as well as the County have always been a resource for grassroots
groups. And we have provided information to anybody who needs information. And at
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anytime they can call on us and as a matter of fact, if issues come up we are always
the first to provide information to the community through news releases or any such
materials to the media as well as to the community groups in specially called
meetings.

W ould th e groups have to com e to the D epartm ent or call you or does
th e D e p a rtm e n t...
If there is an issue, we are usually the first to alert the community. And based on
that we call meetings and indicate that we need to provide information. Or some of
our news releases, which often get picked up by the media, will also direct
individuals and groups if there is any need for further information to the
appropriate numbers.

So, fo r the firs t tw o recom m endations,
a lre a d y m eeting those needs?

you

feel

th a t

the

D ep artm en t

W e've always been doing both. We don't do what they want is a different thing. But
providing objective information and an objective approach to issues, we've always
done that.

Although Dr. Jinadu continues to assert that the Department has "always been a
resource for grassroots groups," Rosa and Stormy strongly disagree. While Rosa has
never considered the Department to be a resource, Stormy's primary reason for
distrusting and disliking Dr. Jinadu is based on the fact that he did

qoî

provide

"information to anybody who needs information."
His next claim — "If there is an issue, we are usually the first to alert the
community" — misses the point that Rosa and Stormy are trying to make with respect to
the importance of illness prevention through toxics use reduction; alerting the
community to health problems after they have already affected the community is not good
enough, especially when dealing with toxics. Stormy would be able to challenge his claim
since the Rosamond cancer was discovered by accident.
In his last response to this recommendation he clearly states that he can't just do
what Rosa and Stormy want him to do because he must make "objective" decisions. The
line that he draws between his "scientific" approach versus their "emotional" demands
is reflected in almost all of his comments. It is his way of justifying the Department's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

is

66
approach to toxics without having to directly address the issue of illness prevention
through toxics use reduction and pollution prevention.

3)

H old p u b lic m eetin gs in the Im pacted co m m u n ities to pro vid e residents
w ith the o p p o rtu n ity to ask qu estio n s and exp re ss th eir concerns
re g a rd in g to xic fa c ilitie s and other p u b lic h ealth p ro b lem s.
The Department has always done that when issues arise.

If B u tto n w illo w resid en ts w anted to ask q u e stio n s ab o u t h ea lth hazards
a s s o c ia te d w ith toxics, w ould the D epartm ent be w illin g to hold a
m e e t in g ?
W e did that in Buttonwillow very specifically if their memories serve them right.
You know I was right in the middle of it along with state staff. W e held meetings. We
tended to questions. And that’s always been the approach."'

H ave you held other m eetings or was that the only one?
You don’t hold meetings just for the sake of holding meetings.

But

if they

had

m ore questions?

They should contact us and we would be glad to talk to them. W e are not adverse to
holding meetings. But at the same time I'm not going to schedule a meeting every
month.

S o If they contacted

you...

W e would be more than willing, the Department has always been available. W e
always put out news releases. This Department is very visible. But at the same time
this Department is not just going to provide answers that people just want if they
are not based on scientific facts or appropriate public health measures. The
Department has to be objective. That's the main point. The Department has to do what
the Department has to do. But at the same time we tend to the whole community and
anybody in the community has access to this Department.

Dr. Jinadu's stated willingness to talk and meet with community members
represents a potential opportunity for grassroots groups that they might want to
consider pursuing. Stormy, for obvious reasons, would question the sincerity of Dr.

"I The meeting Dr. Jinadu refers to was the one held by the State regarding the
Birth defect study done by California Birth Defects Monitoring Program.
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Jinadu's offer, wtiile Rosa would be faced with the problem of gaining access to a meeting
place.
Based on Rosa's and Stormy's experiences, it is not clear whether he would keep
his word. Although Dr. Jinadu once again speaks with confidence about the accessibility
of the Department, he still follows with the explanation; "But at the same time this
Departm ent is not just going to provide answers that people just want if they are not
based on scientific facts or appropriate public health measures." While he claims that
the Department is willing to meet with community, he also continues to draw the line
which separates his "objective" approach from people who "just want" certain answers.
His stubbornness about this issue suggests that he might not be very receptive to
comments from the community, especially if there is talk about implementing a
different approach to toxics.

4)

B eco m e m ore ac tiv e In the perm itting process. W hen g rass ro o ts
group s are atte m p tin g to stop the siting or exp ansion of to xic
fa c ilitie s , a tte n d p u b lic h earin g s to p ro vid e In fo rm a tio n a b o u t
p o te n tia l health problem s associated w ith exp o su re to to xics. A dopt a
p re c a u tio n a ry app ro ach to toxics w hich reco g n izes th a t e x p o su re to
to x ic s rep resen ts a public health th reat even if hard s c ie n tific data
h a s n 't lin ked s p e c ific h ealth problem s w ith a s p e c ific fa c ility .
Once again the Department will have to make objective determinations and this
recommendation is unacceptable because they are asking us to ignore specific facts
just to do what they want. I can't do that. At the same time, the Department, public
health departments, are advocates, not just for the poor, for the rich, to protect the
community. So, facts that protect the community are what the Department will tend
to but it is unacceptable and really illegal to just go in and say that you are going to
take your own personal measures. So what the Department will do will be something
that is objective.

Dr. Jinadu's interpretation of the recommendation — "they are asking us to
ignore specific facts just to do what they want" — requires further examination because
Rosa and Stormy could easily argue that they are asking him to do just the opposite.
Instead of asking him to blindly "ignore specific facts just do what they want," they want
him to recognize M of the facts, including the fact that data gaps exist, the fact that
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standards are not always adequate, and the fact that regulations can and have been
broken. Nothing in the recommendation suggests that he should base his approach on his
own "personal measures." In fact, Rosa and Stormy simply want him to tell the whole
story about toxics including the fact that many of these toxics are known carcinogens.
This isn't information that Rosa and Stormy are inventing because they are overly
emotional; it is "objective" information that they want him to communicate to decision
makers involved in the permitting process.

5)

B ecom e m ore accessible to m em bers of grassroots groups w ho are
try in g to prom ote illn ess preven tio n and to xics
use red u c tio n in their
c o m m u n itie s . C u rren tly, m em bers of th ese groups feel no co n nectio n
w ith th e D epartm ent and are unaw are of the D e p artm e n t's role in their
co m m u n ity. The D epartm ent shouid com m unicate
w ith these groups to
d e te rm in e how the two parties can create and sustain effe ctive
w o rk in g re la tio n s . P u b lic h ealth o ffic ia ls s h o u ld v is it the co m m u n ity,
m eet w ith com m unity leaders, and take a tour of the to xic fa c ilitie s .
W e've taken the tours of the facilities. We've met with them. Again, if there is any
way to increase the level of understanding of the role of public health, we'd be glad to
do that. W e are not adverse to meeting with groups and we'd be glad to do that. Again,
we don't have any list of what groups are out there but at the same time, once we
know, and we know the need, we always try to meet the need. And we'd be glad to do
that.

Have you taken a tour of the sites in Rosam ond?
I've been everywhere. I've been to Rosamond, to McFarland...That's what the
Department has always done. W e have always been there. We've always visited the
place even other places where there has been lead...We've been there. We've given
information to the community. W e've met with the residents. There is an approach, a
policy which we take in any of these issues. Again, it's always been that people don't
feel like w e’ve done enough or done anything. But at the same time, just because
someone wants us to say or come to a conclusion that favors them, that is something
we cannot do. W e have to be objective. The key word 1 want to emphasize is
"o b je c tiv ity ."

Once again Dr. Jinadu strongly asserts that the Department has always been there
for the communities. In addition, he claims that "if there is any way to increase the level
of understanding of the role of public health, we'd be glad to do that." Rosa's and Stormy's
previous comments clearly demonstrate that the "level of understanding" needs to be
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increased; Rosa's lack of experience with the Department has left her with little
knowledge of the Department's role in her community, while Stormy was willing to pay
someone from the Department to take a tour of the facilities. Although Dr. Jinadu states
that there is an approach the Department takes which includes meeting with community
m embers and touring facilities, it appears that the Department's path rarely intersects
with grassroots community groups. This is not surprising considering the Department
has no list and no knowledge of the grassroots groups In these communities. Although the
Departm ent might visit the community and tour the facilities, it needs to make the effort
to m eet specifically with members of grassroots groups because they are most involved
with issues of toxics in their communities.

6)

A s sig n a perso n to deal s p e cifically w ith to x ic -re la te d issues. The
e m p lo y e e w o u ld be resp o n sib le fo r m a in ta in in g file s c o n ta in in g
in fo rm a tio n on the to xic fa cilities in each co m m u n ity. The files w ould
keep records regarding; 1) the name and quantity of all the chem icals
a t each site; 2) the nam e and quantity of chem icals being stored,
tre a te d , and e m itted ; 3) the regulatory record of each fa c iiity
in c lu d in g in fo rm a tio n on v io la tio n s , a c c id e n ts , s p ills etc. The
e m p lo y e e w ould also be responsible for keeping the D ep artm en t
upd ated on any propo sals for siting a new toxic fa c ility or expanding
an e x is tin g fa c ility . In ad d itio n , the em ployee w ould stay in d irect
co n ta c t w ith the s ta te and federal agencies involved in the reg ulatio n
o f th ese fa c ilitie s . The data collected abo ut these fa c ilitie s w ould be
e x tre m e ly u seful if a can cer clu ster or o th er h ealth problem s
a p p e a re d .
That Is impractical. Within the budget realms you cannot have just one person doing
things. In this day and age people do more with less. My resources cannot
accommodate just assigning one person to one job. I have people doing ten different
types of jobs.

W ould It be feasib le for a person to pick up som e of these
responsibilities?
W e don't keep any specific data but there are places we can get it when we need to. So
that's appropriate...CDC (Center for Disease Control) is a resource, the state is a
resource. So, in other words, information is there. And if I have an issue in
community "x" I can call toxics at the state level and say give me data on this.
Information is right at every one's fingertips. To assign a person to do that is a
resource we just don't have.
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Stormy developed this recommendation because she wants the Department to be
better prepared; she wants the Department to actively take steps to prevent another
Rosamond tragedy. Dr. Jinadu's response indicates that he has faith in the current
regulatory system and its ability to provide him with the appropriate information
w henever it is needed: "Information is right at every one's fingertips." The Rosamond
investigation clearly demonstrates that this is simply not true.

Prior to

the

investigation, very little was known about these sites. Charles White, chief of the state's
permitting unit explained that the Toxic Substances Control Department does not
regularly inspect these sited because they are not licensed as hazardous waste
generators: "Basically these facilities really came to our attention in the past year and a
half or so...W e basically have been trying to get a handle on whether they do produce
hazardous wastes and trying to determine if they do comply with the law and regulations"
The State's lack of knowledge about the Rosamond sites contradicts Dr. Jinadu's claim
that he can get the appropriate data whenever needed. Stormy argues that this is the
information

7)

the Department should have on file.

C o n d u c t fo llo w -u p In v e s tig a tio n s in c o m m u n itie s th a t have su ffe re d
fro m c a n c e r c lu s te rs , b irth -d e fe c t c lu s te rs or
o th e r h e a lth problem s
th a t are suspected to be linked to exposure to toxic chem icals. This
fo llo w up w o rk sho uld in clu d e providing c o u n selin g s erv ice s to the
paren ts and fam ilies w ho are suffering from the
loss of a fam ily
m em ber or frien d . These people often have questions that have not
been answ ered and could ben efit from a m eeting w ith pubic health
officials.
Again, when you spend 5 years investigating a cluster, how much follow up do you
have? You cannot keep this open forever.

How ab o u t su rvivors?

Do

you

do any follow up?

W hat kind of follow up? W e don't do primary care. W hat kind of counseling are we
going to give. That is something they can have with their own primary care provider.
That's not a role, no public health department plays that role. Again, it's one thing to
expect but at the same time let's be real. When you spend four years investigating
Rosamond and McFarland, I don't know what follow up you need. At the same time, in
Buttonwillow there is no link, and this assumes there is a link. I want to quickly
dispel that there is no link. So what link are they talking about "when suspected to be
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linked to toxic chemicals?" There is no link. So I think that needs to be reflected in
the record.

W hen you say that there Is no link, do you think that the scien tific
s tu d ie s th ese days are capable of stating , w ith 100% c e rta in ty , that
th e re Is no link?
The key words are "these days" and "100%." Let's take that out of our dictionary.
There is nothing in life that is 100%.

So,

it

is

p o s sib le

th at there

Is s till

a

link?

No. Again, we're coming from different angles. All I'm saying is that what you know
today is what you know today and if you cannot prove anything, all right. But if you
are waiting for 100% , life is not 100% so let's be real. O.K.?

Dr. Jinadu argues that it is not the Department's responsibility to offer
counseling services because the Department is not a primary care provider. He also
questions the need for follow-up work since the investigation lasted for 5 years.
Stormy's point is that parents who have suffered the loss of a child still have questions
that haunt them; if health officials from the Department participated in such a long
investigation, wouldn't they be more qualified than a private counselor or doctor to
answer questions about the cancer cluster?
Dr. Jinadu points out that this recommendation assumes the health problems are
linked to toxics; he is quick to have the record reflect that there is no link in
Buttonwillow. Once again, his actions are dictated by the presence or absence of
"scientific " evidence. When he is asked to consider the possibility that "science" may not
be capable of proving such a link, he explains, "There is nothing in life that is 100%."
This is just the point that Rosa and Stormy are trying to make; from their perspective,
this understanding should convince health officials to take a precautionary approach
when dealing with toxics-related health issues. Instead, Dr. Jinadu accepts the
limitations of science; he is clearly satisfied with the Department's approach to toxics
and sees no reason to change the status quo.
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Summary
The major points that appear throughout the recommendations are the following;
1) The Department needs to adopt a precautionary approach to toxics that supports its
stated mission to protect public health. This approach must be based on a commitment to
illness prevention through toxics use reduction and other pollution prevention
measures: 2) The Department needs to improve communication networks throughout the
communities: most importantly, the Department should establish a connection with the
grassroots groups so that ideas, information and resources can be exchanged.
W hen Dr. Jinadu responded to these recommendations, he explained with
confidence that there is no need to change or even question the Department's current
approach to toxics. Instead, he argues the following: 1) the Department has always been
there for the communities: 2) the Department already has a toxics policy that is based
on objectivity and the practice of science: and 3) the Department is sensitive to the
needs of the community although it cannot simply provide them with the answers they
want.
The following chapter examines the implications of the Department's toxics
policy in order to answer the central research question: How does the Department's
toxics policy affect Padres' struggle for environmental justice?
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Chapter 6
Im p lic a tio n s

of

the

D epartm ent's

Toxics

Policy

The central research question remains, how does the Department's toxics policy
affect Padres' struggle for environmental justice?
In the previous chapters, Dr. Jinadu argues that the Department bases its actions
and decisions on a "scientific" approach to public health. This commitment to the
practice of "science" is reflected in its toxics policy according to which toxics do not
represent a health threat unless scientific evidence establishes a causal relationship. In
other words, toxic substances are innocent until proven guilty.
Before examining the effects of the Department's toxics policy on Padres, this
chapter provides background information on the current standards and regulations
governing hazardous waste management. Although there are many ways to evaluate a
regulatory system — Do the regulations establish appropriate standards? Are they
enforceable? Are there loopholes that people can exploit? — this section evaluates the
standards and regulations by examining the scientific practice of risk assessment upon
which they are based. It is important to understand the risk assessment process because
it directly shapes the Department's toxics policy.
Following the background discussion, this final chapter argues that the
Department's toxics policy directly undermines Padres' efforts to achieve
environmental justice for the following two reasons: 1) the policy makes the
Department less accessible to grassroots community groups as a potential source of
information and support; and 2) the policy conflicts directly with the goal of illness
prevention.

73
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Background
Dr. Jinadu believes that toxic facilities are not inherently hazardous because
federal and state standards have been developed to protect public health; he reasons:
"That's why we live by standards." When asked whether towns like Rosamond should be
burdened with another toxic facility, he answered: "Why not?...because we use the word
hazardous or the word toxic there are standards already set in place...based on the
knowledge of that particular material."^
The National Research Council (NRC)^ does not share Dr. Jinadu's confidence in
the current federal and state standards; in a report investigating the effect of hazardous
waste on public health, the NRG reached the following conclusion: "The legislative
mandates, policies, and programs of the federal and state agencies that currently manage
hazardous-waste sites are inadequate to the task of protecting public health."3 The NRG
found this to be true even in the management of Superfund sites; some of the major
conclusions from this part of the investigation stated the following: 1)public health
effects of exposure to hazardous waste sites have not been adequately assessed because
remediation is the top priority rather than the assessment of public health risks; 4 2)
data on exposures and health effects are inadequate because during the past ten years less
than one percent of the estimated 4.2 billion [dollars] spent to evaluate Superfund sites
f Dr. Jinadu, telephone interview by author, 17 February 1995.
2 Members of the National Research Council are drawn from the councils of the
National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of
Medicine.
3 The National Research Council, Environmental Epidemioloav: Public Health and
Hazardous Wastes (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991), 69 [hereinafter
NRG , Environmental Epidemioloav].
4 Ibid., 6-7. "Analyses of the limited federal and state regulatory support for
environmental epidemiology reveal, however, that the intent of Congress in creating
Superfund has not been realized, in that the public health consequences of exposures to
substances from hazardous-waste sites have not been adequately assessed...The
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) notes that efforts to assess
candidate NFL sites typically relegate public health concerns to a minor role; the
process as a whole is directed at remediation, rather that at the assessment of public
health risks."
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were used to examine health risks;^ and 3) the health of nearby residents could be
threatened because there is no system of managing hazardous sites that incorporates the
early assessment of health risks.®
The NRC report presents several shortcomings in our government's approach to
the m anagement of hazardous waste. The following section argues that the scientific
process upon which the regulations and standards are based — risk assessment — is a
weakness that contributes to the fact that the regulations and standards governing
hazardous waste do not adequately protect public health.

R is k

A ssessm ent

The ERA and state agencies employ a scientific process called risk assessment to
manage the production, use, treatment, storage and disposal of toxic chemicals. The
human health risk assessment (HRA) process typically includes the following steps:
"1) hazard identification - determination of whether a pollutant adversely affects
human health; 2) dose-response assessm ent - determination of the relationship
between the level of exposure and the probability of occurrence of adverse effects;
3) exp osure assessm ent - determination of the extent of exposure; and 4 )rls k

5 Ibid., 257. "During the past ten years, less than one percent of the estimated
4.2 billion spent each year on hazardous waste sites in the U.S. has been used to evaluate
health risks at Superfund sites. As a result, existing data on exposures and health effects
are inadequate either to support decisions on the management of hazardous waste sites or
to allow the conduct of epidemiologic investigations of the health impact of these sites."
6 Ibid., 258. "At NPL sites where potentially critical exposures are detected,
there is no regular application of an adequate system of early assessment of the health
risks involved or the need for interim action to protect the health of exposed
populations. The failure to construct a system for managing hazardous waste sites that
incorporates the early assessment of health risk means that the health of nearby
residents could be imperiled. Moreover the conditions for development of environmental
epidemiology are adverse and impede the development of useful scientific investigations
of many important questions."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76

c h aracterizatio n - description of the nature and often the magnitude of risk,
including the accompanying uncertainty."^
In addition to health risk assessments, there is another step to the risk
assessment process called "quantitative risk assessment" (QRA). QRA attempts to
provide a more specific calculation of the threat of toxics to human health by assigning a
number to measure the damage caused by exposure to certain chemicals or sources of
pollution. The calculations are used to determine the number of additional cases of cancer
that would result when a number of people are exposed to a certain concentration of a
single pollutant. Q RA involves the following steps: "1)Evaluating whether a specific
substance or substances increase the incidence of a disease; 2) Estimating the types and
amounts of pollutants released; 3) Estimating what concentration of pollutants may be
transported to the point of exposure; and 4) Estimating what extra exposure risk to that
concentration might exist (e.g., one extra cause of cancer in a million people exposed).
Q RA is employed to answer many difficult public and environmental health
questions. W hat types and quantities of toxic chemicals can be discharged into the soil,
water or air? W hat are “acceptable” human exposure levels? While decision-makers
characterize QRA as providing scientific answers to these questions, it is important to
understand the limitations of this process. The following section analyzes the various
weaknesses of QRA.

W eaknesses

of

Q u a n tita tiv e

R isk

A ssessm ent

The major weakness of QRA is that a significant amount of uncertainty is present
in the majority of its measurements and calculations. As a result, many important

^ United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Risk Assessment.
1992.
8 Robert Ginsburg, "Quantitative Risk Assessment: The Illusion of Safety,"
Fvervone's Backyard. 9:1 (August 1991): 18.
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decisions are based on assumptions and estimations. Some of the sources of this
uncertainty include:

•

Data Gaps — The majority of toxic chemicals have not been tested to determine
their effects on humans and the environment; the resulting lack of data — "data
gaps" — limits our understanding of the possible hazards associated with most
chem icals currently in use. In addition, more than 500 new chemicals are
introduced into commercial use each year.9 The United States General Accounting
Office (GAO) evaluated EPA's chemical testing program and confirmed that the
data gaps are extensive.^®

•

Single dose-response testing — Scientists use QRA to evaluate a single
chemical's effect on human health and the environment; QRA does not take into
account the fact that people are exposed to more than one chemical at any given time.
By ignoring the reality of multiple exposures, QRA does not protect the public from
the cumulative effects of toxic chemicals; although test results may conclude that a
person can be exposed to a certain amount of chemical "x" for a specified length of
time without being harmed, testing is not done to determine the effects of an
exposure to chemical "x" in addition to chemicals "a" through "z." QRA also ignores
the possibility that multiple exposures may lead to synergistic effects; synergistic
effects occur when two or more chemicals interact to produce an effect that is more
hazardous than the sum of their individual effects. Very few chemicals have been
tested for their potential to interact with other chemicals.'' ^

•

S ensitive populations -- QRA assumes people are equally sensitive to exposure
to toxics. This is an oversimplified approach because there are many individual
differences that can increase the risk, including, age, sex, inherited traits, diet,
pregnancy, and overall state of health. In general, children are at a much greater
risk than adults.12

9 Environmental Research Foundation, "Birth Defects...Part 2: Why Birth
Defects Will Continue to Rise," Rachel's Envkonmental & H_e_aJtJh W eekly 4 1 1( October
1994).
10 United States General Accounting Office. Toxic Substances: EPA's Chemical
Testing Program Has Not Resolved Safety Concerns (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, G A O /R C E D - 91-136, 1991), 2. "EPA has made little progress in
developing information on the safety of the thousands of chemicals that affect our daily
lives and has not taken action to regulate , or warn the public about, chemicals found to
be harmful. Since TSCA (Toxic Substances Control Act) was enacted in 1976, EPA has
received health and environmental results on only 22 chemicals and assessed the results
for 13 of these chemicals. Under the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 the
Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to require industry to test
potentially harmful chemicals. Depending on the results, the EPA can regulate or ban the
use of chemicals found to be hazardous to human health or the environment."
11 Hazard Evaluation System & Information Services (HESIS), Understanding
Toxic Substances: An Introduction to Chemical Hazards in the Workplace (California
Occupational Health Program. Berkeley, CA, 1986).
12 Ibid.
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U n re g u late d su b stances — Non-conventional pollutants (N C Ps) refer to the
unidentified and unregulated chemicals in our environment. Since we have no
knowledge of these pollutants, they add to the uncertainty in any calculation
regarding the potential threat of toxics.^ 3

E xtrapo lation from m odels -- Since scientists are not allowed to experiment
directly on humans, the majority of data used in QRA calculations is gathered from
experiments on lab animals. As a result, models are needed to extrapolate the
chemical's effect on lab animals into the probable effect on humans. Interpreting data
from these models contributes to the uncertainty of QRA results for two main
reasons. First, chemicals do not affect all species to the same degree; some species
are more sensitive than others depending on the chemical and the dose. Variation in
chemical sensitivity exists not only between humans and lab animals, but also among
the different species of lab animals used in the experiments. Second, in order to keep
costs at a minimum, many of the experiments work with doses that are much higher
than those encountered in the human environment. A variety of models are used to
extrapolate probable low-dose effects from the high-dose bioassays. Although most
models yield similar results when examining high-dose effects, models using lowdoses can vary by three or four orders of magnitude.

The significant weaknesses of risk assessment provide valid reasons to question
the continued use of this scientific process. Should we trust a process based on
incomplete data, estimates, and assumptions to answer important questions that directly
and significantly impact the health of humans, non-human species and the environment?
It is crucial to understand that the Department advocates current standards and
regulations governing the management of toxics within the context of profound
u ncertainty.
The remainder of this chapter argues that the Department's toxics policy directly
undermines Padres' efforts to achieve environmental justice for the following reasons:
1) the policy makes the Department less accessible to Padres as a potential source of

13 NRC, Environmental Epidemioloav. 10. "There is evidence that NCPs are a
potentially important source of hazardous exposure. Some preliminary toxicological
studies suggest that NCPs have important biological properties, environmental
persistence, and mobility...In the broadest sense these unidentified, unregulated
substances represent a risk of unknown magnitude. The absence of evidence of their risk
is solely the result of the failure to conduct research; it should not be misconstrued as
demonstrating that NCPs and "inert" pesticides components are without risk."
14 Steven A. Broiles, "Health Risk Assessments: A Critical Scientific Technique
for Environmental Regulators and Litigators," Los Angeles Lawver (March 1994), 37.
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information and support; and 2) the policy conflicts directly with the goals of illness
p revention.

A c c e s s ib ility
Local health departments are often the primary or only source of health care and
information in low-income and rural communities. In order to effectively serve the
needs of these communities, local health departments must be culturally and
economically accessible to the surrounding communities. The Department's mission
statement addresses this goal of accessibility by directing the Department to "maintain
culturally appropriate education and public health promotion efforts" and "improve the
quality and cultural competency of the Department's operations, services and
programs." However, it is not enough just to make services available to the public; in
order to achieve the goal of accessibility, the Department must actively reach out to the
communities to stay in touch with their needs, concerns and questions. The following
mandate of the Department's mission identifies the importance of outreach by
establishing that it is the Department's responsibility to "build and foster strong
partnerships for health with local public/ private health and social service agencies,
community based organizations, consumers, educational institutions and other interested
community groups.
Did the Department "build and foster" a strong partnership with Padres?
According to Rosa, the "role of the Department in Buttonwillow has been zero."^^
Considering the fact that the Department has never heard of Padres, it is obvious that the
Departm ent has not formed a strong partnership with this group. Instead, the
Department's involvement with the Buttonwillow community has had the opposite effect;
while Padres worked to educate the community about the potential health hazards
associated with Laidlaw's dump. Dr. Jinadu's announcement that the dump did not cause
15 Kern County Public Health Department, "Mission Statement."
Rosa-Solorio-Garcia, personal interview by author, 10 November 1994,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80

the birth defects sent a message to the community that directly challenged the validity of
Padres' position. Many chose to believe the Department, and as a result, Padres lost
credibility in its community.
The Department has also not taken steps to "build and foster" a strong
partnership with SKRAP. When Dr. Jinadu failed to send Stormy the risk assessment
document she requested, his lack of cooperation and confrontational attitude convinced
her that SKRAP would not benefit from a partnership with the Department: "Because of
that experience with Jinadu, I certainly wouldn't have gone to Bakersfield to enlist their
aid because t felt like they were totally out of it." Stormy also has the impression that
the Department doesn't care about her community: "I don't think he's ever been up here
to have a tour of these sites. I don't think he cares. And 1 don't think these people want to
be out in the dirt. I think they want to be in their offices. They don't consider our
feelings.

^

It is important to note that Dr. Jinadu has taken a tour of the sites. The fact that
Stormy was unaware of his visit to her community provides testimony to the lack of
communication and partnership between the Department and SKRAP, especially
considering the fact that Stormy has given many tours of the toxic facilities, including
tours to state health officials; she went so far as to state: "I would pay for someone from
the Department to take a tour. Maybe they could speak to some of these parents because
we have very haunted people here. I find it unconscionable that we can't get a report, any
interest shown, any compassion shown for any of these families."^®
•The condition of the Department's relationships with Padres and SKRAP strongly
suggests that the Department has not effectively translated its written commitment to
the goal of accessibility into practice. The fact that the Department does not keep a
record of the grassroots community groups in Kern County also leads one to suspect that

17 Stormy Williams, telephone Interview by author, 4 January 1995.
18 Ibid.
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the Department's relationships with Padres and SKRAP are not exceptions to the rule;
there is a good chance that the Department is unaware of the existence of a significant
number of community groups.
Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect the Department to have "strong partnerships
for health" with every community group in Kern County. However, SKRAP's experiences
with the Department reveal that the Department often fails to communicate with these
groups, and without this most basic connection, the possibility of developing
partnerships is slim at best. And if the Department gives community leaders the
impression that it is unwilling to offer information and assistance, they, like Stormy,
will become unwilling to work with the Department.

H e a lth y

C itie s

P ro je c t

Although it is clear that the Department has failed to develop partnerships with
Padres and SKRAP, one should not conclude that the Department intentionally avoids
working with community groups. Dr. Jinadu claims that the "Department as well as the
County have always been a resource for grassroots groups," and "if there is any way to
increase the level of understanding of the role of public health, we'd be glad to do that."
The Department is currently involved in a project — the Healthy Cities Project — which
supports Dr. Jinadu's claim that the Department is committed to working with
community groups.
The international "Healthy Cities Project"

emerged in 1986 as a joint initiative

of the Health Promotion and Environmental Health programs in the European Regional
Office of the World Health Organization (W HO). The Project was intended to address the
long term goal of “Health for All by the year 2000" in which all people would benefit
from "a level of health which allows them to lead socially and economically productive
lives." The Healthy Cities model focuses on "process for community improvement.
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Resident participation in determining health needs as well as devising and implementing
solutions is the cornerstone of the Healthy Cities approach. The public and private
sectors of the community are also vital partners in this process." In general, the model
"conceptualizes community health in its broadest dense, to include the physical
environment, economic conditions, and the social climate within the city."'’ ^
The Project has attracted participants from all over the world including 35
European cities; many of the European cities are national networks for their countries,
and as a result, hundreds of cities world wide are involved. In addition, there are
national networks in the United States, Canada and Australia.^o
The California Department of Health Services is the first and only state health
agency which funds a Healthy Cities Project. The California Healthy Cities Project is
managed by the Western Consortium for Public Health , a non-profit independent
organization which represents the Schools of Public Health and Extension Divisions at
the University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles. In order to become a California
healthy city, the following requirements must be met: "1) passage of a city resolution
that endorses participation in the project and reflects commitment to the healthy cities
concept; 2) identification and recruitment of local steering committee members
representing a broad cross section of the community; and 3) submission of a project
description and a one-year work plan."^^
The California Healthy Cities Project brochure explains that a "high priority of
many healthy cities initiatives is the empowerment of residents who — for reasons of

19 Western Consortium for Public Health, California Healthv Cities Project
(Sacram ento, CA, 1992).
20 In the United States, the National Healthy Communities Initiative supports the
Healthy Cities Project by operating a clearinghouse for information; providing advice
and resources to start local and statewide projects; organizing national and regional
conferences; and publishing newsletters. The National Healthy Communities Initiative is
jointly run by the National Civic League, based in Denver, Colorado and the United States
Public Health Service.
21 Joan M. Twiss, "The Healthy City: An Idea Whose Time Is Right," Western Citv
(O ctober 1991): 2.
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poverty, low levels of education or English language skills — may previously have lacked
the knowledge, skills, and opportunity to improve their own health."22

a

brief

description of a few of the programs is included to provide a better understanding of
some of the healthy cities' goals and accomplishments;

•

M onterey Park - This city initiated a program called LAMP (Literacy for all
Monterey Park) to serve its population which is 65% Asian and 35% Latino. The
program works with 300 functionally illiterate adults and people needing tutoring
in English as a Second Language. The program is run by a staff of approximately 100
volunteers.

•

Escondido - La Vida Buena Coalition in Escondido received a three year grant from
the California Department of Health Services to work on the development and
implementation of culturally appropriate health promotion programs to address the
major diseases affecting the city's Latino population. The Coalition conducted a needs
assessment and a survey of 305 Latino residents, and developed programs to increase
physical activity and promote nutritional education.

•

R ohnert Park - There were two main projects initiated in this city. The
first was the passage of a 100 % smoke-free restaurant ordinance; the
"Tobacco-Free Business Project" received an $150,000 grant which was
used to provide 500 local businesses with free educational materials, selfhelp guides, assistance in developing worksite policies, and smoking cessation
classes. The second project was a survey of over 120 individuals which
asked the people to express their health concerns and needs in addition to any
barriers that might stop them from using the services. Community members
formed an advisory committee and California State University, Sonoma
provided technical assistance. The survey defined the following needs: a
supervised activity center for youth, a coordination of substance abuse
education, treatment and prevention programs, and a multi-service center to
provide one-stop access for health and human services.

The Kern County Health Department has made a commitment to support cities
that want to participate in the Healthy Cities Project: "The Department will provide
technical assistance to communities to form coalitions, assess community needs,
determine project goals and plans, design a marketing or media plan, develop program
materials, plan program events, develop public policy, or in any way that is needed."23

22 W estern Consortium for Public Health, California Healthv Cities .Project
(S acram ento, CA, 1992).
23 Department's literature on Healthy Cities Project. Photocopied.
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The Project directly addresses the goal of accessibility. The Department's
involvement demonstrates that it does work with community groups in an attempt to
develop "strong partnerships for health." The question remains, why

has the

Department failed to achieve the goal of accessibility in the case of Padres and SKRAP?
This question can be answered if one revisits the Department's mission statement. The
mission directs the Department to "build and foster strong partnerships for health;" it
is clear that the Department needs to actively pursue connections with communities.
Although Dr. Jinadu states that the Department is "more than willing" to work with
community groups, a distinction needs to be made between actively initiating
partnerships, versus passively being "willing" to work with community groups. As
Rosa's and Stormy's comments have demonstrated, the Department is not initiating
contact with grassroots groups. As a result, the Department’s passive approach places
the responsibility of initiating a relationship on grassroots groups like Padres.
There are several reasons why it is difficult for groups like Padres to initiate a
relationship with the Department. First, grassroots community groups often exist on
very few resources including time and money. During her interview, Rosa testified that
limited resources directly shape Padres' perspective and approach to problem-solving:
“...I think the way we do things, we only react to what happens. We don't have long term
goals because we are all full-time workers." Rosa explained that she rarely has an
opportunity to make phone calls much less initiate a relationship. Second, language and
cultural barriers can make members of grassroots groups feel uncomfortable initiating
relationships with people holding positions of power. Rosa explained that her culture
teaches women not to question anybody or anything. The final reason is that many
residents are not familiar with the Department's mission, programs and services
because the Department has played such a limited role in Buttonwillow; as a result, it is
unlikely that residents would think of turning to the Department as a potential source of
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assistance or information. For example, neither Padres nor SKRAP is aware that the
Departm ent participates in the "Healthy Cities Project."
Although Rosa identified reasons why it would be difficult for Padres to initiate a
relationship with the Department, she explained that a relationship would be beneficial:
Definitely. For Latinos, if it is information about their health or about their
children, especially their children, they are going to go. The majority of the
people involved in this are involved because they want something better for
their children. There's nothing more important than their children. Latino
families in Buttonwillow don't have money. They don't have luxuries. The most
important thing in their lives are their kids.

Although the Department claims it is willing to work with community groups,
and although Padres believes that a relationship with the Department would be
beneficial, a partnership has not developed because neither the Department nor Padres
has initiated contact. Instead, they function in isolation without sharing ideas, concerns,
or strategies. How does the Department's toxics policy contribute to the dynamic of this
relatio n sh ip ?

D e p a rtm e n t's

T o x ic s

P o licy

The Department's toxics policy intensifies this dynamic because it magnifies the
polarization between "experts" such as the Department, and "non-experts" like Padres.
As "experts," the Department practices a scientific approach to public health that
focuses on gathering and interpreting statistically significant numbers and "objective"
data.

As "experts" they use their scientific findings to define what qualifies as a public

health threat. As "experts" they design and implement public health policies. However,
as "experts" they perform these scientific tasks in isolation, and as long as the
Departm ent remains isolated from the communities it serves, the Department will fail
to achieve the goal of accessibility.
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The Department's policy Intensifies the isolation, magnifies the polarization, and
makes the Department less accessible to grassroots community groups like Padres
because it promotes the continued use of a "scientific," risk assessment-based,
decision-making arena that is guarded by very rigid borders; while these borders allow
"expert" people, perspectives, and problem-solving strategies to enter the arena, “non
experts" and their ideas are excluded and devalued. The language spoken within this
arena is highly technical; it was invented by "experts," for “experts." The dialogue
revolves around mathematical models, statistically significant numbers, and scientific
analysis. This exclusive arena makes it extremely difficult for "non-experts" to
participate in the decision-making process;
EPA has also effectively cut out public participation by reducing the risk
discussion to a technical calculation which requires technical expertise to do the
calculations and to argue over the basic assumption in the risk assessment.
Furthermore the public is put on the defensive by seeming to oppose good,
"state-of-the-art" s c i e n c e . 24

Although this exclusive, "scientific" arena is surrounded by very rigid borders,
the grovyth of the grassroots environmental justice movement reflects the fact that an
increasing number of "non-experts" are exercising their right to participate in the
decision-making process. Once inside this arena, however, "non-experts" are faced with
the daunting challenge of affecting an approach to public health even more rigid than the
borders created to defend it. This approach dictates that there is a right way and a wrong
way to practice public health; while the "expert," "scientific" approach is deemed valid,
any other approach is devalued.
The Department's toxics policy promotes this inflexible approach to public
health; it draws a solid line between "experts" and "non-experts," and at the same time
predetermines that the "scientific" approach is the only valid and correct approach to
public health. Dr. Jinadu believes that the Department makes sound, "objective" public

24 Robert Ginsburg, "Quantitative Risk Assessment" 19.
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health decisions based on "science," while "non-experts," tend to "conjecture," "jump to
conclusions," or make recommendations based on an "emotional high." Opinions and
recommendations from the "non-expert" public, including Padres, are automatically
devalued because they do not use the same technical scientific language, they are not
based on mathematical models, and they do not have statistically significant data to prove
with certainty that toxics caused the health problems in their community.
A review of Dr. Jinadu's response to the following recommendation made by
Padres and SKRAP provides insight into the Department’s opinions of the "non-expert"
approach to public health:

B e co m e m ore ac tiv e in the p erm ittin g process. W hen g rassroots
group s are a tte m p tin g to stop the siting or expansion of toxic
fa c ilitie s , a tte n d p u b lic h earin g s to p ro vid e in fo rm a tio n ab o u t
p o te n tia l h ealth problem s associated w ith exp osure to to xics. A dopt a
p re c a u tio n a ry ap p ro ach to to xics w hich reco g n izes th a t exp o su re to
to x ic s rep re s e n ts a public h ealth th reat even if hard s c ie n tific data
h a s n 't lin k e d s p e c ific health problem s w ith a s p e c ific fa c ility .
Once again the Department will have to make objective determinations and this
recommendation is unacceptable because they are asking us to ignore specific facts
just to do what they want. I can't do that. At the same time, the Department, public
health departments, are advocates, not just for the poor, for the rich, to protect the
community. So, facts that protect the community are what the Department will tend
to but it is unacceptable and really illegal to just go in and say that you are going to
take your own personal measures. So what the Department will do will be something
that is objective.

Dr. Jinadu argues that this recommendation is "unacceptable" because it would
require the Department to act in a way that is not objective: "they are asking us to
ignore specific facts just to do what they want...it is unacceptable and really illegal to
just go in and say that you are going to take your own personal measures." The
Department's toxics policy and its attitude toward the "non-expert" approach to public
health allow it to dismiss the recommendation without carefully evaluating its validity.
Is Dr. Jinadu's interpretation of this recommendation accurate? Are Padres and SKRAP
really asking the Department to "ignore specific facts just to do what they want?"
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Instead of asking the Department to ignore facts, It appears entirely likely that
Padres and SKRAP are advocating that the Department consider alt of the facts: it is a
Iâ £ i that data gaps exist; it is a fast that the risk assessment process is riddled with
uncertainty; it is a fact that standards are not always adequate; and it is a fact that
regulations have been and will continue to be broken.
Rosa explained that she wants the Department to inform her community about the
potential health hazards associated with exposure to toxics :
I would want them to say, if there are chemicals that can cause birth defects by
smelling them, if there in the water, whatever, 1 want them to say that to the
community. I would want them to hold an informational meeting. It would have to
come from the Health Department saying that these are possibilities- Once you
know these things are possible, would you still want Laidlaw there?25

Although Dr. Jinadu argues that "non-experts" "jump to conclusions,"
"conjecture," and make recommendations on an "emotional high," Padres' concern that a
potential link exists between exposure to toxics and birth defects is legitimate; in fact,
there is "objective," "scientific" data that support this position:
There is abundant scientific evidence that birth defects in laboratory animals and
humans have occurred as a result of exposure to four classes of pollutants;
radiation, pesticides, toxic metals (including lead, mercury, cadmium), solvents
and dioxin-like chemicals including PCBs. Because municipal landfills and toxic
w aste dumps are laced with pesticides, toxic metals, solvents, dioxin-like
compounds, and sometimes even radio-active materials, at least seven studies
have now reported finding unusually high numbers of birth defects in children
born to parents residing near

d u m p s .

26

Padres and SKRAP want the Department to consider these facts when developing
and implementing public health policies regarding toxics. They also want the Department
to share this information with the public and with decision-makers. Their
recommendation is consistent with the Department’s stated mission to conduct public
health education and outreach. However, the Department's toxics policy and its emphasis

25 Rosa Solorio-Garcia, personal interview by author, 10 November 1994.
26 Environmental Research Foundation, "Birth Defects."
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on scientific certainty does not allow the Department to practice this approach to public
health unless there is scientific proof that a causal relationship exists.
This demand for "scientific" certainty or proof has intensified the isolation and
magnified the polarization between the Department and the communities it is mandated to
serve:
T hese different conceptions of risk inevitably lead to misunderstandings and
distrust. Many scientists and regulators are contemptuous of public perceptions
of risk and readily characterize public perceptions as being wholly out of touch
with reality.2 7

The Department's policy magnifies the polarization between "experts" and "non
experts" and, as a result, the Department is failing to achieve the goal of accessibility.
This conflicts directly with the mission and responsibility of local health officials. By
not being accessible, the Department is not in touch with community concerns and needs.
In addition to the fact that the Department's toxics policy makes it less accessible to
grassroots groups like Padres, it also hinders Padres struggle for environmental justice
because it directly conflicts with the goal of illness prevention.

Illness Prevention
In the broadest sense, the Department's mission is to protect public health. The
Director of the Department's Division of Health Promotion and Public Information, Dr.
Manzoor Massey, describes the mission in further detail: "Public health means
prevention and that has to be the bottom line in all of our operations. Otherwise, we re
in the wrong business."

He continues to explain that illness prevention is the

27 John P. Dwyer, "The Limits of Environmental Risk Assessment," Boalt Hall
Transcript. (Based on an article to be published in the Journal of Energy Engineering,
D ecem b er

1990): 2 2 -2 3 .
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Departm ent’s top priority: "Absolutely. No doubt about it. Without prevention you are
only giving lip service."2 8
Although the Department's commitment to illness prevention is clearly
expressed in its mission statement, it is not reflected in the Department's toxics policy.
The Department's toxics policy does not promote illness prevention for two main
reasons: 1) the Department does not recognize a situation as a public health threat
unless there is scientific evidence that proves a causal relationship; the Department's
demand for scientific certainty guarantees that people must be harmed before any action
is taken; and 2) the Department’s toxics policy supports the practice of pollution
control instead of toxics use reduction. Since the Department's policy does not promote
illness prevention, it is not consistent with its overall mission to protect public health.

" S c ie n t if ic

C e r ta in ty "

Dr. Jinadu explained throughout his interviews that the Department must have
scientific certainty or proof before taking action: "If any situation poses a threat, the
Departm ent will be there - if there is proof, if there is a connection ... Is there any
scientific evidence that there is any more danger just because its toxic (or is it ) that
we all just don't want it?... Just because something is labeled "toxic" doesn't mean it is
hazardous to public health'29 (emphasis added).
The Department remains committed to this approach even though it is incredibly
difficult, if not impossible, to find the cause of illnesses suspected to be linked with
toxics. This was clearly demonstrated in the investigation of Rosamond's childhood
cancer cluster. In a report that examined public health and hazardous wastes, the
National Research Council reached the same conclusion: "The world of epidemiology, like
that of any human science, seldom permits the elegant inferences to be drawn about
28 Dr. Manzoor Massey, personal interview by author, 17 November 1994.
29 Dr. Jinadu, telephone interview by author, 17 February 1995.
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causation. The object domain of epidemiology consists of numerous uncontrollable
aspects, with considerable variations.''^0
Identifying the causes of chronic illnesses like cancer and birth defects is
exceptionally challenging. Chronic illnesses often have a long latency period which
means that there is a delay between the beginning of an exposure and the noticeable
symptoms of the illness. As a result, it could take weeks, months, or years for the
illness to be recognized; this latency period makes it very difficult and often impossible
to link the illness with a specific chemical, a specific exposure level and a specific
tim e.^ 1
Even though public health officials recognize the difficulty in establishing a
causal relationship, the Department still bases its decisions on the presence or absence
of scientific proof. This perspective is directly opposed to the goal of illness prevention
because it guarantees that people will be harmed before the Department even initiates an
investigation. A weekly newsletter published by the Environmental Research Foundation
discusses the implications of this approach on the rate of birth defects: "A society that
dem ands scientific certainty before it will restrict the use of suspected teratogens
guarantees that the rate of birth defects will continue rising. Scientific certainty about
anything involving humans, is, and will remain, elusive and

P o llu tio n

C o ntrol

vers u s

T o x ics

Use

ra re ."3 2

Reduction

Pollution control and toxics use reduction (TUR) are two competing hazardous
waste management strategies. While pollution control techniques manage pollutants after
they have been discharged into the environment, TUR techniques prevent pollution by

30 NRC, Environmental Epidemiology. 4.
31 Hazard Evaluation System & Information Services (H ESIS), Understanding
Toxic Substances.
32 Environmental Research Foundation, "Birth Defects."
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eliminating or reducing the volume and toxicity of the chemicals used in the production
process.
This section begins with a background discussion to further introduce and define
these two strategies. TUR will then be examined in more detail to demonstrate why this
approach more effectively protects public health. Finally, this section briefly reviews
the political tension that surrounds the toxics debate to better understand why the
Departm ent does not promote toxics use reduction.

Background

In 1976, the EPA issued a policy statement to define the government’s approach
to the management of hazardous waste; reducing waste at the source was established as
the highest p r i o r i t y . D u r i n g the 1980's it became clear that this commitment to
waste reduction was not being translated into practice. Government spending during this
time allocated approximately 16 billion dollars per year to all pollution programs,
however, the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) reported that in
1984, only 4 million dollars, less than 1% of the funds, were spent on waste reduction
p r o g r a m s . A s a result, the generation of hazardous waste continued to steadily
increase; while the EPA estimated that the United States produced approximately 1
billion pounds of hazardous waste per year at the end of W W II, more than 22 billion
pounds were discharged in 1987.^^
Although waste reduction was defined as the preferred strategy at the policy
level, in practice, a regulatory-based system, geared towards pollution control.

33 Ken Geiser, “Toxics Use Reduction and Pollution Prevention," New Solutions
(S pring

1990):

43.

34 Ibid., See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. From Pollution to
P reven tion. (Washington D.C., June 1987), 39.
35 Ibid. See, U.S. EPA, The Hazardous Waste Svstem. (Washington, D.C., June
1987).
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dominated the government's approach to hazardous waste management. Pollution control
is described as an "end-of -the -pipe"

approach because its objective is to manage

pollution after it has been discharged into the environment. For example, ash from an
incinerator ends up buried in a landfill. This approach does not result in a reduction of
waste because pollution control techniques merely transfer pollutants from one medium
to another.36
In the mid 1980's pollution control strategies came under attack. There was an
increasing number of leaking landfills that contaminated ground water, and the costs
associated with the treatment and disposal of hazardous waste were rising. Grassroots
activists and others involved in the toxics movement demanded that the government shift
its policies in support of waste reduction. Unlike pollution control, the goal of waste
reduction is to reduce the volume and toxicity of hazardous waste before it is discharged.
This approach is also referred to as "source reduction."
In 1984 Congress attempted to re-establish the government's commitment to
waste reduction by passing the "Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments" to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act: "The Congress hereby declares it to be the national
policy of the United States that, whenever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is
to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as

p o s s ib le ."3 7

However, once again,

policy-level commitment did not translate into effective waste reduction practices.
In 1986 the OTA released an influential report — "Serious Reduction of
Hazardous Waste: For Pollution Prevention and Industrial Efficiency" — that advocated
the need for a new approach to hazardous waste management.33 This report argued that

36 Mark Rossi, Michael Ellenbecker, and Kenneth Geiser, "Techniques in Toxics
Use Reduction: From Concept to Action,"

New Solutions (Fall 1991): 25-26.

37 U.S. Congress, Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984. P.L. 98-616
(98 Stat. 3 221). Novem ber 8, 1984.
38 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, "Serious Reduction of
Hazardous Waste: For Pollution prevention and Industrial Efficiency," Washington D.C.,
S eptem ber, 1986.
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pollution control techniques, those that focus on the regulation of the discharge,
treatm ent and disposal of hazardous waste, should be replaced with "pollution
prevention" techniques, those that focus on the reduction and elimination of the
generation of hazardous waste. OTA advocated pollution prevention for the following
reasons; 1) pollution prevention benefits government because less waste entering the
environment reduces the risk of mismanagement and lowers the cost of environmental
treatm ent and remediation; 2) pollution prevention benefits companies because it
lowers the costs associated with waste treatment, and fewer raw materials are needed
because they can be recycled and reused in production; and 3)pollution prevention
benefits everyone because it slows the depletion of natural resources.
While many in the toxics movement have fought hard to establish waste reduction
as the top priority, there is a growing movement of activists who believe that the goals
of pollution prevention can most effectively be addressed by reducing the volume and
toxicity of the chemicals used in production processes. This strategy — Toxics Use
Reduction (TUR) — recognizes that waste is not the only form of toxic chemicals that
needs to be reduced or eliminated; 'The objective of toxics use reduction is the reduction
or elimination of toxic chemicals in production whether the chemicals appear as waste,
by-products, intermediaries, feed-stocks, or constituents of finished consumer
products.
An important goal of the TU R and pollution prevention management strategy is to
make sure that toxics-related health and environmental hazards are not transferred
from one medium to another or from one population group to another. This objective is
clearly defined in one of the leading state-level toxics use reduction bills; the
Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act of 1989 defines TUR as "in-plant changes in
production processes of raw materials that reduce, avoid, or eliminate the use of toxic

39 Ken Geiser, "Toxics Use Reduction," 45.
40 Ibid., 46.
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substances or generation of hazardous by-products per unit of production so as to reduce
risks to the health of workers, consumers, or the environment without shifting risks
between workers, consumers or parts of the environment."^^
TUR Techniques

The Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act (TURA) defined the following TUR
techniques to help industry translate the concept of TUR into technologies and practices
that effectively reduce the use of toxic c h e m ic a ls ^ ^ :

•

In process

recyclin g - reusing or recycling a product within a production

process;

•

operations and m aintenance - "good-housekeeping"- handling chemicals with
greater efficiency without changing the production process. Examples include;
em ployee training, management initiatives, spill and leak prevention, and materialhandling improvement;

•

produ ction

unit redesign or m odification - changing or redesigning the
production unit to one that requires fewer or no toxic inputs;

•

p ro d u ctio n

u nit

m odernization - upgrading or replacing existing production

unit equipment;
•

in p u t su b stitu tio n - replacing the chemical(s) of concern with a non-toxic or
less toxic alternative;^^ and

•

p ro d u ct reform ulation - redesigning a product to create a product that has less
or none of the toxic chemicals contained in the original. Example: manufacturing
water based inks instead of organic solvent-based inks.

The Office of Technology Assessment reviewed these various techniques and found
that the most effective techniques are employed the least. The most effective techniques

41 Mark Rossi et al., "Techniques in Toxics Use Reduction," 26-27. See
Massachusetts General Laws, "Massachusetts toxics Use Reduction Act," Chapter 211
July 2 4 , 1989.
42 Ibid., 2 7-30 .
43 Input substitution can be problematic because the "less" toxic chemical may
be more hazardous in other ways. One must carefully study the replacement chemical to
understand its potential impacts on workers, the public and the environment. There is
also the chance that a chemical may be considered less toxic because it has not yet been
thoroughly studied and labeled "toxic."
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are input substitution and product reformulation because they have the greatest
potential to eliminate the use of toxics, however, the most frequently used techniques
are recycling and operations and management (O&M) because they are usually easier and
cheaper to implement.

Differences Between TUR and Pollution Control

There are several fundamental differences between pollution control and TUR.
W hen one reviews these differences it becomes clear that TUR techniques more
effectively achieve the goals of pollution prevention and illness prevention. In addition,
TU R increases the opportunity for public participation in the decision-making process,

•

Burden of Proof - Pollution control is founded on the assumption that the current
regulatory system can adequately protect public health; as a result, toxic substances
are innocent (not a public health threat) until proven guilty. TU R adopts a
precautionary approach towards toxics and works to reduce or eliminate the use of
toxics regardless of whether an existing health threat can be proven; as a result, one
of the primary objectives of TUR is to prevent exposure whenever possible.

•

Alternatives - Pollution control techniques discourage the development and
implementation of safer alternatives to toxic chemicals because the primary
objective is to design and enforce a regulatory system to manage pollution after it
has been discharged. Since the central goal of TUR is to reduce or eliminate the
production and use of toxics, the development and implementation of alternatives is
one of its highest priorities.

•

Im plem entation - Pollution control depends on enforceable regulatory control.
TUR advocates recognize that relying on general regulations to promote TUR is
problematic for several reasons: 1) industries vary significantly with respect to
size, technology, market, and product; 2) there are not enough funds to effectively
enforce a comprehensive regulatory system; and 3) there is strong resistance
throughout industry against the introduction of new regulations. Instead of the
conventional regulatory approach, TUR policies employ government mandated
planning, goal setting and performance standards, government technical assistance,
and financial incentives.

•

D e c is io n -m a k in g and public p a rtic ip a tio n - Decisions within the pollution
control management system are generally made behind closed doors and are rarely
challenged by a demand for public accountability. TUR encourages negotiated planning
that questions the use of chemicals in the production process; as a result, there is a
greater opportunity for public participation and local accountability in the decision
making process.
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Illness Prevention

Although pollution prevention is reemerging as a priority on the policy level,
pollution control remains the dominant approach to hazardous waste management; How
and to what extent should we manage the production, use, treatment, storage and disposal
of toxic chemicals? As discussed earlier, EPA and other "expert" decision-makers
employ risk assessment to answer these types of questions. Although the risk assessment
process is riddled with uncertainty, decision-makers still claim that it can be used to
safely manage toxics.
As long as pollution control remains the primary goal, decision-makers will
continue to employ risk assessment to support their policy and management decisions.
This use of risk assessment perpetuates an approach to toxics — pollution control —
that is fundamentally opposed to the goals of pollution and illness prevention:
In reality this [risk assessment] is a sophisticate form of the dilution solution.
This '"acceptable risk" level is by definition an average and in almost all cases
there will be some people exposed to higher levels and others exposed to lower
levels. However, this is quite consistent with the goal of managing and not
preventing exposures. EPA can now calculate a minimum level of exposure which
is independent of any particular site and which ignores the ability to achieve
lower emissions, better clean-ups or even eliminate the use, discharge or
exposure to a contaminant.'^^

Pollution control techniques will never be able to prevent illness because they
are based on the philosophy that toxic substances are innocent until proven guilty; in
other words, as long as we control and properly manage toxic substances, they do not
pose a threat to public health. The Department's toxics policy is also based on this
philosophy; it does not consider toxics to be a public health threat unless there is
scientific evidence that proves a causal relationship. By supporting this philosophy the
Departm ent’s policy is committed to the concept of pollution control. There is nothing in
the philosophy of pollution control that encourages the Department to take steps to

4'^ Robert Ginsburg, "Quantitative Risk Assessment," 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98

prevent exposures. While the Department's policy supports the idea that toxics are
innocent until proven guilty, Padres, SKRAP, and many others in the toxics debate argue
that toxics use reduction must be the top priority in order to achieve the goal of illness
prevention.

Political

Considerations

The Department claims that it practices a scientific approach to public health
because it must make objective decisions without "taking sides." A weekly newsletter
published by the Environmental Research Foundation suggests that there may be
additional motivating factors behind the Department's emphasis on scientific certainty.
This newsletter offers a theory explaining why the presence or absence of scientific
certainty has such a significant influence on the actions of public health officials;'^^
Given the philosophical climate, public health officials are reluctant to raise an
alarm on less-than-100% -certain data. As a practical matter an official will get
in much more trouble for raising a false alarm about a suspected chemical than
for making the opposite error (which allows birth defects to continue). In the
p re se n t philosophical clim ate (requiring scientific certainty), even well
justified alarm based on less-than -certain data draws an angry response from
powerful monied interests. On the other hand, allowing birth defects to continue
will only affect one family at a time. Individual, unorganized victims do not
threaten a public health official’s job security.'^®

Padres and SKRAP agree that political pressures greatly influence the
Department’s actions. When Stormy was asked to make recommendations for the
Departm ent, she referenced the situation in Buttonwillow:
If the Department thought that the Buttonwillow dump was lending itself to the
illnesses, to the birth defects, they could exert their influence. W e're not saying
they can write closure notices but they could be holding meetings, press
co n feren ces, writing letters, saying that residents are already unjustly
exposed... But they won't do that because this is an oil and agricultural county.
They'd have the Board of Supervisors and the oil people raising hell. You see the
County gets 10% of Laidlaw's gross income and that means there is a direct

45 Environmental Research Foundation, "Birth Defects."
46 Ibid.
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conflict of interests. Any agency that gets fees will not be honest. I'm just
ashamed of the County.

Although lengthy technical documents detail Laidlaw's proposed expansion to
"prove" that the facility will not significantly impact human health or the environment,
Padres and other community members are not convinced. They understand that liners
cannot guarantee that leaks will not occur, they are aware that accidents can and have
happened involving the facility and the trucks transporting the hazardous material, and
they know that an expansion increases the volume of hazardous waste and the potential
risk to human health and the environment. During the final meeting of the County Board
of Supervisors, Lorenzo Garcia, a resident and member of Padres, expressed his
concern for the health of Button willow's children:

I'm here as a father to speak because I am quite worried...Everyone has been
talking about money, the time involved, and time tables and things, but nobody
has said anything about the children and the future of our children, what sort of
future can our children stand to expect with a toxic dump site with thousands and
thousands of cubic feet? And if we have gone to CRLA and Greenpeace, we have
done it because you, our Supervisors, our officers, have done nothing to help us
in learning how to deal with this.47

Throughout Padres' struggle with Laidlaw, the Department did not participate in
the permitting process and did not actively support either side. Nevertheless, the
Department influenced the County's position and its response to the community's
concerns. After the Board of Supervisors listened to testimony from both sides, the
meeting was closed to public comment and the members of the Board presented their
final comments before calling for the vote. At this time. Supervisor Peterson began his
testimony which eventually led to his vote in favor of the expansion. He addressed the
issue of health risks at the beginning of his statement:

47 Lorenzo Garcia, Testimony from the written transcript of the Kern County
Board of Supervisors meeting. Kern County, California, 12 December 1994. Mr.
Garcia's testimony was translated during this meeting and recorded in the written
tra n s c rip t.
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The, the health risks, I've talked to Doctor Jinadu about and these birth defects.
Two of the problems that cam e up, the people that had those problems weren't
here during their first trim ester which is when that type of problem would
occur of pregnancy (sic). And he said that it's attributed to other areas although
the babies were born in this area and he feels it's no significant health risk as a
result of air emission or some other problem during pregnancy.'^®

Supervisor Peterson's description of his exchange with Dr. Jinadu is consistent
with the Department's toxics policy; without scientific evidence to prove a causal
relationship, the Department would conclude that the dump does not represent a
significant risk to human health or the environment. When Peterson made this reference
to Dr. Jinadu's assessment of Button willow's birth defects cluster, the meeting had
already been closed to public comment; there was no opportunity for the public to
question or challenge the validity of Dr. Jinadu's position or the accuracy of Supervisor
Peterson's c o m m e n t . I n s t e a d , Peterson used his communication with Dr. Jinadu to
validate the position that the dump does not represent a significant health risk. During
this meeting which lasted more than 8 hours, the Board of Supervisors spent very little
time deliberating over the possible health risks associated with the dump. The majority
of the meeting focused on the translation issue and a review of the competency of the
Local Assessment Committee.
The conclusion reached by the Department and the County — the Laidlaw facility
does not pose a significant health risk because there is no evidence that it caused the
birth defects or other illnesses in Buttonwillow — is consistent with the philosophy that
toxics are innocent until proven guilty. This philosophy places the burden of proof on
groups like Padres to demonstrate that toxic chemicals are a threat to public health. As a

48 Supervisor Ken Peterson, Testimony from the written transcript of the Kern
County Board of Supervisors meeting. Kern County, California, 12 December 1994.
49 Supervisor Peterson made a false statement when he claimed that 2 out of the
three mothers did not live in Buttonwillow. According to the California Birth Defects
Monitoring Program's report, "Neural Tube Defects in Kern County: Buttonwillow Area
Investigation," only one out of the three mothers was dropped from the study because she
w as not a Buttonwillow resident.
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result, "non-experts" have to challenge and disprove conclusions reached by "experts."
The burden of proof issue greatly impacts Padres because its limited resources and
general lack of technical expertise make it very difficult, if not impossible, for the
group to provide arguments that would satisfy the "scientific" standards required by the
Departm ent and other decision-makers like the County Board of Supervisors. If groups
like Padres can't prove that Laidlaw's facility will lead to illness in its community, the
decision becomes based on a cost-benefit analysis; in this type of decision-making
arena, political forces significantly influence the final outcome.

Summary
As long as the presence or absence of scientific certainty continues to dictate the
actions and decisions of the Department, its toxics policy will undermine Padres efforts
to achieve environmental justice for two primary reasons: 1) the policy makes the
Department less accessible to community groups as a source of information and support;
and 2) the policy conflicts directly with the goal of illness prevention.
Although the "non-expert" perspective is often devalued and dismissed as
"emotional" and "biased," it is important to note that Padres and SKRAP are not arguing
that the Department should abandon its "objective" approach to public health. They are
not asking the Department to exaggerate or overreact. Instead, they want the Department
to adopt a precautionary approach to toxics that takes into consideration the fact that
there are well-documented human and environmental health hazards associated with
toxic chemicals. They believe that the Department should adopt a toxics policy that
promotes toxics use reduction instead of pollution control.
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Conclusion

This research paper addresses the following question; How does the Kern County
Public Health Department's toxics policy affect Padres struggle for environmental
justice? It concludes that the Department's toxics policy directly undermines Padres'
efforts to achieve environmental justice for two primary reasons: 1) the policy makes
the Department less accessible to grassroots groups as a potential source of information
and support: and 2) the policy conflicts directly with the goal of illness prevention.
This final chapter is organized into three main sections that provide concluding
remarks regarding: 1) Padres and the grassroots environmental justice movement; 2)
the Department and its role in the environmental justice movement; and 3) the
relationship between Padres and the Department and the potential for these groups to
work together in the future.

Padres
Like the majority of community groups in the environmental justice movement,
Padres encounters many obstacles because it is trying to create fundamental changes
within the dominant white culture, a culture that has established effective institutions
to protect its ownership and control of the nation's political and economic power.
Although there are thousands of groups like Padres engaged in local battles over specific
environmental hazards, these immediate threats are symptoms of a much greater
problem .
Poor communities and communities of color are threatened by systemic problems
rooted in social, political and economic injustice. Padres' struggle is not just about
preventing the expansion of Laidlaw's toxic dump. It is about empowering and mobilizing
a community to fight for social and economic justice. It is about changing the heavily

102
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skewed distribution pattern of political and economic power, and it is about increasing
public participation in the decision-making process. Therefore, although Padres and
other community groups face many difficult challenges, and although Padres and others
might lose their individual battles, the environmental justice movement is becoming
stronger and more effective because an increasing number of communities are
organizing to create structural changes that address the systemic problems threatening
poor communities and communities of color.

Kern Countv Public Health Department

At first glance, the Department's role in Padres' struggle for environmental
justice is not easily defined; the Department does not officially participate in the
decision-making process governing the proposed expansion of the dump, and the two
groups do not have an established relationship. Nevertheless, the influence of the
Department is significant. This paper examined two main reasons why the Department’s
toxic policy directly undermines Padres' efforts to achieve environmental justice.
First, the policy makes the Department less accessible to community groups as a
potential source of information and support. The Department's demand for scientific
certainty — toxics are not a threat unless scientific evidence proves a causal
relationship — creates a barrier between itself and community groups like Padres,
between "experts" and "non-experts. " Community concerns and recommendations are
often prematurely labeled and dismissed as "emotional" and "biased." This devaluation of
the "non-expert" approach isolates the two groups and decreases the potential for the
developm ent of an effective working relationship.
Second, the Department's toxics policy does not support Padres' efforts because it
conflicts directly with the goal of illness prevention. The Department's emphasis on
scientific certainty does not prevent illness because people must be harmed before any
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action is taken. In addition, this policy supports the conventional approach to hazardous
waste m anagem ent — pollution control —

which is an "end-of-the-pipe" strategy that

focuses on managing pollutants after they have been discharged. Pollution control does
not prevent pollution or illness because it perpetuates the myth that toxics can be
"safely" managed, that toxics are innocent until proven guilty. As a result, pollution
control techniques make no effort to reduce or eliminate the use of toxics. Toxics Use
Reduction, a strategy committed to eliminating or reducing the volume and toxicity of the
chemicals used in production processes, was presented as the preferred alternative
because it promotes pollution prevention and illness prevention.
While this paper evaluated the effects of the Department's toxics policy on
Padres, it was beyond the scope of this research to delve into the motivating forces that
shape the policy. Although the Department argues that its actions and decisions are based
on science and an objective approach to public health. Padres and SKRAP contend that
political pressures significantly influence the Department's approach to toxics. The
Kern County Board of Supervisors favors the proposed expansion of Laidlaw's facility;
the County would benefit from the expansion because it receives ten percent of Laidlaw's
gross income. As an employee of the County, it would not be in the Department's best
interest to challenge the County's position.
Within the political climate of Kern County, the Department's policy provides a
good measure of job security; the Department's conservative approach to public health
does not question the status quo or attempt to implement controversial policies that
would m eet with the disapproval of the County. Instead, the Department's policy and
approach to toxics supports a system that employs quantitative risk assessment and
pollution control techniques. As long as the Department maintains this policy, it will
continue to undermine Padres' efforts and the efforts of the environmental justice
movement, and it will fail to achieve its own stated goal of illness prevention.
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Relationship. Between the Department and Padres
W hen I first began this project I had an idealistic vision that Padres and the
Department could work together effectively. Since both groups share the goal of illness
prevention, I hoped the Department would recognize the importance of supporting the
environmental justice movement. However, after conducting interviews with
representatives of the Department and Padres, I began to seriously question whether
groups with such different perspectives could find common ground.
Currently, there are significant obstacles hindering the development of a
successful partnership. The Department's devaluation of the "non-expert" approach
makes it very difficult for Padres to participate in the decision-making process, and the
Department is less accessible as a source of information and support. Furthermore, the
two groups' perspectives on public health and toxics — what they define as the problem
and what they define as the solution —

are vastly different; while Padres and other

environmental justice activists focus on the need to make structural changes to alleviate
the systemic problems of social, political and economic injustice, the Department's
conservative approach to toxics supports the status quo, including the use of quantitative
risk assessment and pollution control techniques.
Although the barriers are significant, the Department's mission statement
clearly establishes that one of its objectives is to "build and foster strong partnerships
for health" with the communities it serves. While Dr. Jinadu expressed repeatedly
during his interviews that the Department would be more than willing to meet with
Padres, there is a strong possibility that the politically charged issue of toxics and the
proposed expansion of the dump would stifle any potential for the development of a
successful partnership. It is highly unlikely that the Department will abandon its toxics
policy to embrace the goals of toxics use reduction. Nevertheless, it might be possible
and worthwhile for Padres to initiate communication with the Department so that the
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issue of toxics Is brought to the table as a legitimate public health concern of the
Buttonwillow community.
The Healthy Cities Project (Project) has the potential to facilitate
communication between Padres and the Department. In theory, the Project could help
remove some of the barriers between these two groups because one of its primary
objectives is to involve the community as much as possible in the decision-making
process. Instead of devaluing the "non-expert" community perspective, the Project
recognizes the importance of developing community leadership; the community plays an
integral role in defining its health needs and implementing solutions. The Department
participates as a system of support but it is not there to dictate the course of action. This
approach to problem solving encourages constructive dialogue between groups like the
Department and Padres because at least in theory the "experts" and the "non-experts"
are equal partners. Because the Healthy Cities Project focuses on the process of
improving the health of a community, it shares some of the goals of the environmental
justice movement; the Healthy Cities model "conceptualizes community health in its
broadest sense, to Include the physical environment, economic conditions, and the social
clim ate within the city."^
Many Healthy Cities projects have dealt with more traditional public health
issues such as increasing childhood immunization rates. The toxics issue is politically
volatile and would most likely be difficult to incorporate into a Healthy Cities project.
How would the Department react to a community that wanted to examine toxics as a
public health threat? According to the Project, the community defines the health need it
wants to address; in theory, if the community focused on reducing the threat of pollution
and toxics-related illnesses, the Department is supposed to assist. Even if the
Departm ent refused to participate in a project focused on toxics use reduction, the toxics

I W estern Consortium for Public Health, California Healthy Cities Protect
(Sacram ento, CA, 1992).
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issue would receive more attention and the concerns of the community would be voiced.
Perhaps this would create some opportunity for the development of an effective
communication link between Padres and the Department.
It remains to be seen whether Padres and the Department could work
cooperatively on a Healthy Cites project. Would Padres be willing to initiate contact with
the Department? Would the Department listen to and respect Padres' perspective, or
would the toxics debate create too much tension and conflict? These are just a few of the
many questions that remain unanswered. As a grassroots community group Padres faces
significant obstacles: How will the group fare in the years to come? It may also be many
years before we know whether Laidlaw is allowed to expand the dump.
Regardless of how future events unfold, it is important to recognize that even if
Laidlaw is allowed to expand its dump, Padres struggle represents a victory for the
environmental justice movement. The victory is the fact that there was a struggle in the
first place. For too long these types of decisions have gone unchallenged. Similarly,
while the Department may never adopt toxics use reduction strategies, the purpose of
this paper was to question and challenge its toxics policy. The Department should be held
accountable to its stated mission to prevent illness. Hopefully this paper can be useful to
Padres and other groups willing to help redefine the role of local health departments in
the environmental justice movement.
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Recom m endations

The environmental justice movement questions the fundamental structure of our
"modern," "democratic," society. How are decisions made? Who makes them? How do
they affect our communities? How can "non-experts" participate in the decision-making
process? How can community groups help create structural changes to address the
systemic problems of economic, political, and social injustice?
The following recommendations are directed at Padres, SKRAP and other
community groups that may be interested in challenging the Department's toxics policy.

1 . I n it ia t e

C o n ta c t

Based on the Department's current relationship with Padres and SKRAP, and
based on the fact that it does not keep a list of the community groups in Kern County, it
is evident that the Department does not actively "build and foster strong partnerships
for health" with groups like Padres. Therefore, it is necessary to initiate contact with
the Department. While this is certainly no guarantee that the Department will
enthusiastically embrace such a gesture, at the very least it provides an opportunity to
learn more about the Department's mission, its services, and the role it plays in your
community? This knowledge allows you to evaluate more accurately the strengths and
weaknesses of the Department's policies, actions and decisions. Contacting the
Departm ent will alert it to the fact that your group exists, and it may provide you with
an opportunity to voice your group's concerns, including any specific opinions about the
Department. It is important to hold the Department accountable to its stated commitment
and obligation to protect public health.

1 08
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2.

P articip a te

in

the

Healthy

Cities

Project

As local health officials, the Department must be accessible to the communities it
serves. According to its mission statement, one of the Department's responsibilities is to
"build and foster strong partnerships for health." Although the issue of toxics is likely
to create tension, the Healthy Cities Project provides a structure in which the
community is encouraged to voice its health concerns. And, at least in theory, the
Department has made a commitment to assist communities that want to participate in the
Healthy Cities Project.
The Healthy Cities Project might be able to create some common ground between
your group and the Department because its goals are consistent with those of the
environmental justice movement; the Project focuses on the need to empower people, the
need for public participation in determining health needs and devising and implementing
solutions, and the need to revise the current definition of community health so that it
includes the physical environment, economic conditions, and the social climate within
the city.
If the Department is not willing to work on a project that focuses on toxicsrelated health issue, it is important to remind the Department of the main objective of
the Healthy Cities Project: "Resident participation in determining health needs as well
as devising and implementing solutions is the cornerstone of the Healthy Cities
approach." Although there is no guarantee that the Department will accept your
proposal, the efforts your group makes to participate will send important messages: 1)
your group is concerned about toxics-related health issues; 2) your group is committed
to reducing the threat of toxics in your community; and 3) your group is willing to work
with the Department to achieve this goal. The Department needs to be constantly
reminded that there are concerned residents of Kern County who are dedicated to the goal
of toxics use reduction. It is imperative to question and challenge the Department as
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often as possible and the Healthy Cities Project provides an opportunity to present your
group's concerns.

3 . P a rtic ip a te

in

the

D ecision-m aking

Process

Increasing public participation in the decision-making process is one of the
major objectives of the environmental justice movement. Community groups must
play a more active role in influencing the decisions that affect the health of their
communities. Currently, the atmosphere in most "public" hearings is hostile and
intimidating to members of the public. Decision-makers set the agenda and dominate
the discussion. Members of the public need to change the current "rules" of behavior.
Make sure that your issues of concern are not ignored or prematurely dismissed
without being addressed in a meaningful and thorough manner. Demand to be given
enough time to voice your opinions; there is no reason why decision-makers should
be granted an unlimited amount of time to engage in a debate that directly affects
your community, while members of the public are only given 3-5 minutes to
comment.
Furthermore, the structure of most meetings places the public comment period
at the end of the meeting, if there is time. This places you at a distinct disadvantage
because decision-makers are often tired and eager to bring the meeting to a close. In
addition, your comments have less of an impact if you are trying to address issues
that have already been discussed earlier in the meeting; request that the public be
allowed to comment on each issue before moving on to the next. This will guarantee
that your voice is heard throughout the meeting, and it will ensure that the meeting
will not come to an end before you are allowed to speak. If English is not your first
language, request that a translator be provided to translate your comments as well as
those of the decision-makers.
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4 . Shift the

Burden

of Proof

The burden of proof is currently placed on community groups to demonstrate that
toxics are a threat to public health. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove
that a causal relationship exists. As a result, the concerns and recommendations of
the "non-expert" community groups are often labeled as "emotional" and "biased."
Instead of accepting the burden of proof, your group needs to make a strong effort to
shift this responsibility to the polluters and the decision-makers. For example, if
there is a proposal to site or expand a toxic facility, ask the interested parties to
provide "proof" that your community will not be harmed. In the case of the
Department, Dr. Jinadu's reasoning — toxic facilities like Laidlaw's and those
scattered throughout Rosamond are not a public health threat because there is no
proof that they caused the illnesses — should be challenged. W here is the proof that
they didn't contribute to the health problems of those communities. W here is the
proof that an expansion of Laidlaw's facility will not negatively impact the health of
Buttonwillow residents?

5.

Reject

Risk

Assessm ent

and

Pollution

Control

Although the quantitative risk assessment process can provide information about
the hazards or risks associated with a particular substance or action, it should not be
misinterpreted as a scientifically proven measurement of what is and is not "safe. "
Because its measurements are riddled with uncertainty, it should not be employed by
policy-makers and decision-makers to convince the public that there is no need for
concern, and no need to research, develop, or implement safer alternatives.

Your group

should pressure the Department and other decision-makers to adopt a precautionary
approach to toxics that recognizes that uncertainties must be considered in any risk
assessment and policy decision. The reality is that risk assessment can never be
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perfectly accurate. It can never account for all of the factors that affect the equation, and
it shouldn't be assumed that unknown factors are not hazards .
Risk assessment is fundamentally opposed to the concept of developing
alternatives to reduce or eliminate the use of toxics. Instead, it focuses on defining the
"acceptable" ways to poison life on Earth. Risk assessment asks the wrong questions:
Which toxic chemicals can be released into the air, water and land? What are acceptable
exposure levels? Your group needs to challenge these questions by asking: Does our
society need to continue using toxics? What are the alternatives? Research,
development, and implementation of alternatives that eliminate or reduce the use of
toxics must be made the top priority.
The public has the right to demand that the Department, other decision-makers,
and polluters make the greatest possible effort to protect public health. Your group
should pressure the Department and other decision-makers to promote toxics use
reduction (TUR) techniques instead of the current pollution control management
strategy, because unlike pollution control, TUR establishes illness prevention and
pollution prevention as top priorities.
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